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THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
In 1957 the United States Supreme Court abro-
gated the absolute nondisclosure privilege of a
government informer. Roviaro v. United States' held
that a defendant is entitled to disclosure of an out-
of-court informer's identity when his identity or
the contents of his communication is relevant and
helpful to the defense or necessary to a fair deter-
mination of the cause.2 The Court applied a balanc-
ing test, rather than stating a rigid requirement of
disclosure.3 Roviaro's balancing test was subse-
quently applied regardless of whether the informer
appeared as a state witness.
4
Then in 1968 Smith v. Illinois5 presented the
Court with a witness-informer who refused to give
his true name or address at trial. The Court held
that the failure to disclose, where the informer was
a principle prosecution witness, his testimony un-
corroborated, and his credibility at issue, denied
the defendant his sixth amendment right to con-
frontation. 6 Roviaro, stated the Court, does not
apply where the informer appears as a state wit-
ness Since then, the Smith test of credibility has
been increasingly applied in place of the Roviaro
balancing standard.8 The new Federal Rules of
Evidence go further still and require absolute dis-
closure whenever an informer appears on the
witness stand. 9 This comment examines the recent
history of the informer privilege, focusing on the
conflicting interests of public policy in effective law
enforcement and protection of the rights of the
accused. This comment argues for a return to the
Roviaro balancing test: such a test is appropriate
to apply to the informer privilege whether or not
the informer appears as a state witness.
1353 U.S. 53 (1957).
2 Id. at 60-61.
'Id. at 62.
4 See cases cited note 33 infra.
5 390 U.S. 129 (1968).6 Id. at 131. "In all criminal proceedings, the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .. .. " U. S. CoxsT. amend. VI.
390 U.S. at 133 n.8.
8 See cases cited note 54 infra.
I FED. R. Ev. 510(c)(1) (1971 Revised Draft).
INTRODUCTION
The role of the government informer'0 has been
recognized since common law times. Private citi-
zens or paid police employees whose contacts with
the underworld provided access to information
about crimes were encouraged to report their in-
formation to the authorities. As a result of this
practice, a privilege developed to prevent the
disclosure of governmenfinformers in a criminal
trial." The privilege belongs to the government,
not the informer, and the policy behind the privi-
lege is to protect the informer and thus encourage
private citizens to report crimes to police.U
10 "Informer" as used herein means any person who
discloses information of violations of the law'to police,
and is used interchangably with "informant."
it See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 209
(1966); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53,59 (1957);
Scher v. United States, 305-U.S. 251, 254 (1938); cf.
In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895) (privileged
communications); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884)
(privileged communications). See also Annot., 76
A.L.R.2d 262 (1961); Annot., 1 L. Ed. 2d 1998 (1957).
A similar privilege exists for a government informer
in a civil trial. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Burlington, 351 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Timkin
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57
(N.D. Ohio 1964); Wirtz v. Continental Finance &
Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1964); Bocchicchio
v. Curtis Pub. Co., 203 F. Supp. 403, 406 (E.D. Pa.
1962); United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D.
Minn. 1949); Annot., 8 A.L.R. FED. 6 (1971). -
The informer's privilege of nondisclosure is separate
and distinct from the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Griffin v. Califqrnia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965);
United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1963).
1 Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938);
In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Vogel v.
Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316-(1884).
What is usually referred to as the informer's privi-
lege is in reality the Government's privilege to
withhold from disclosure the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with enforcement of that law.
The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance of
the public interest in effective law enforcement.
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
Practically, the f urtherance of the public interest ini
effective law enforcement is accomplished by protecting
informers from disclosure and possible harm at the
hands of vengeful defendants. See 8 J. WmooE, Evi-
DENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter
INFORMER PRIVILEGE: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
At common law the privilege of nondisclosure
was absolute. 3 Early cases, both English 14 and
American,' prevented the defendant from ascer-
taining an informer's identity, often recognizing a
governmental right to withhold his production at
trial if the informer was not necessary to prove the
state's case. Recently several jurisdictions have
upheld this right.' 6 As a result of the nondisclosure
cited as WIGMORE]. Professor Wigmore comments
favorably on the public policy need for nondisclosure
of informers:
A genuine privilege, on... fundamental princi-
ple..., must be recognized for the identity of
persons supplying the government with informa-
tion concerning the commission of crimes. Com-
munications of this kind ought to receive encour-
agement. They are discouraged if the informer's
identity is disclosed. Whether an informer is moti-
vated by good citizenship, promise f" leniency or
prosect of pecuniary reward, he will usually
condition his cooperation on an assurance of ano-
nymity-to protect himself and his family from
harm, to preclude adverse social relations and to
avoid the risk of defamation or malicious prosecu-
tion actions against him. The government also has
an interest in nondisclosure of the identity of its
informers. Law enforcement officers often depend
upon professional informers to furnish them with a
flow of information about criminal activities.
Revelation of the dual role played by such persons
ends their usefulness to the government and dis-
courages others from entering into a like relation-
ship.
That the government has this privilege is well
established, and its soundness cannot be ques-
tioned.
8 WIGMoRE § 2374.
See also C. McCoxucx, EVIDENCE § 148 (1954); 4 J.
MooRx, FEDERA PRAcTicE 1584-88 (2nd ed. 1963).
"3 See Comment, The Informer's Privilege In Criminal
Cases, 1967 U. Iui. L.F. 665, 666-67; cases cited note
15 infra.14 In Rex v. Akers, 170 Eng. Rep. 850 (1790), Lord
Kenyon held that "the defendant's counsel have no
right nor shall they be permitted to inquire the name
of theperson who gave the information of the smuggled
goods.'
5 See, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254
(1938) (a federal officer who has made an arrest follow-
ing a tip as to a violation of a federal law may not in a
prosecution for such violation be required to reveal the
identity of his informant, where this is not essential to
the defense); Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952
(5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947);
United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1945); McInes v. United States, 62 F.2d 180 (9th Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 616 (1933); Goetz v.
United States, 39 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1930); Mitrovich
v. United States, 15 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1926); Elrod v.
Moss, 278 F. 123 (4th Cir. 1921); People v. Gonzales,
141 Cal. App. 2d 604, 297 P.2d 50 (1956) (failure to
disclose the identity of out-of-court police informant
was proper where identity could not have proved the
accused innocent and might have had adverse effect
on public policy.)
96 See, e.g., Williams v United States, 273 IP,2d 781
(9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (199);
privilege, the use of government informers in en-
forcing laws-particularly liquor, vice, and nar-
cotics laws-became widespread. 7
Prior to 1957, many jurisdictions upheld the
common law nondisclosure privilege, except where
the defendant was able to show undue prejudice.
For example, in United States v. Li Fat Tang," the
Second Circuit affirmed a conviction for wilfully
transporting and concealing opium. The trial
court's refusal to disclose the name of the informer
who provided information leading to the defend-
ant's arrest was held not to constitute error absent
a defense showing of necessity. In Cannon v. United
United States v. Gray, 267 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1959);
Eberhart v. United States, 262 F.2d 421, 422 (9th Cir.
1958); Washington v. United States, 258 F.2d 696 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); People v. Aldridge, 19 Ill. 2d 176,166 N.E.2d
563 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 873 (1960); People v.
Brown, 73 Ill. App. 2d 214, 219 N.E.2d 534, 535 (1966)
(state has no duty to offer the testimony of a witness
whose existence the state denies.) But see United States
v. Oropeza, 275 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1960).
11 See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies,
Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provacateurs, 60 YAL L.J.
1091, 1093 (1951). Police informers are most often used
in narcotics prosecutions. Apprehension of narcotics
offenders is a major concern of law enforcement officers,
especially when such offenders may supply information
which might lead to the arrest of large-scale dealers
and distributors. Many possessors and sellers of nar-
cotics are arrested on the basis of information supplied
the police by informers. Such informers, usually con-
victed criminals, often drug addicts themselves, are
paid for their information or given immunity from
prosecution or lesser sentences for their own offenses.
See M. HAnsmy & J. CRoss, Tim lrOuamR 3x LAW
ErocEax1N- (1960); Gutteman, The Informer Privi-
lege, 58 J. Cpjf. L.C. & P.S. 32, 33 (1967); Comment,
An Informer's Tale: Its Use In Judicial and Adminis-
trative Proceedings, 63 YAxL L.J. 206 (1953). The in-
former privilege protects the informer from possible
harm and also insures a continuous source of informa-
tion to the police.
The most sophisticated method of acquiring informa-
tion necessary for arrest and prosecution of a suspected
narcotics offender is the police-initiated "controlled
buy." See Gutteman, supra, at 34, 35-36. In a typical
controlled buy, a paid police informer is thoroughly
searched, given marked money, and followed to the
pre-arranged location where the sale is to take place.
Under police surveillance, the informer purchases nar-
cotics with the marked bills. The police immediately
test the narcotics, arrest the defendant, and recover
the marked money. Generally, both the informer and
the corroborating police officer testify at trial for the
state.
On the subject of narcotics prosecution and the in-
former's possible role, see generally People v. McCabe,
49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971) (state statute
classifying marijuana as narcotic held unconstitutional);
Comment, Present and Suggested Limitations on the Use
of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforcement, 41
U. CoLo. L. Rxv. 261 (1969); Note, Extent of the Gov-
ernment's Informer Privilege in Federal and Florida
Criminal Cases, 21 U. FLA. L. Rv. 218 (1968).
18 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).
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States,1" the refusal of the court to require an officer
to disclose the identity of an out-of-court informant
was held not to deny due process, since disclosure
was not essential to the defense. But in Sorrentino
v. United States,20 although the defendant was en-
titled to disclosure, his conviction for sale and
possession of narcotics was affirmed, since he knew
the informer's identity and failure to disclose was
thus harmless error. In Partomene v. United States,2'
the Fifth Circuit held disclosure to be essential to
the defense and reversed a conviction for illegal
sale of narcotics. And in United States v. Conforti,2'
the Seventh Circuit held that where the informer
is a transactant in the possession of counterfeit
notes and his credibility is at issue, his identity
must be disclosed; however, the conviction was
affirmed because the defendant had not properly
inquired into the matter.
WHENt Tirs INFORmER DOES NOT
TESTIFY: RoviARo
The use of police informers and the extensive
invocation of the informer privilege generated an
outcry from defense lawyers which reached the ears
of the Warren Court. In Roviaro v. United States,2n
the Supreme Court held that when the identity of
an informer or the contents of his communication is
relevant and helpful to the defense or is essential
to a fair determination of the cause,u the state's
privilege must give way.25
In Roviaro, the defendant was convicted of know-
ingly possessing and transporting heroin which was
19 158 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 839 (1947).
20 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947).
21221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955).
2 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
925 (1953); See also United States v. Keown, 19 F.
Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937); Wilson v. United States,
59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932); United States v. Blich, 45
F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930); Smith v. State, 169 Tenn.
633, 90 S.W.2d 523 (1936).
21353 U.S. 53 (1957).
4 The courts have determined that this refers to the
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence. See, e.g.,
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305 (1967); Rugen-
dorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); United
States ex rd. Coffey v. Fay, 344 F.2d 625, 633 (2d Cir.
1965).
2 353 U.S. at 60-61. Accord, Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657, 672, 681 (1957) ("A criminal action must
be dismissed when the Government on the ground of
privilege elects not to comply with an order to produce
for defendant's inspection and admission in evidence
relevant statements or reports in its possession of
government witnesses relevant to their trial testimony
.... The government has the burden to decide whether
to produce state secrets or dismiss the prosecution.")
unlawfully imported.26 The informer, "John Doe",
purchased narcotics from the defendant while a
police officer was hidden in the trunk of the in-
former's car and listening to the transaction.' John
Doe was never produced at the trial.2
The Supreme Court- reversed Roviaro's ,convic-
tion, holding that the failure of the trial court to
require disclosure was reversible error where the
informer was a transactant in the crime, did not
appear to testify at trial, and might have been a
material defense witness on the issue of guilt.2 9 The
Court invoked a balancing test to determine when
denial of disclosure violated fundamental fairness:
if the informer's identity or his communication is
material to the defense or essential to determine the
defendant's innocence or guilt, disclosure is re-
quired." But,
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to dis-
closure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls
for balancing the public interest in protecting the
flow of information against the individual's right
to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance
renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend upon
the particular circumstances of each case, taking
into consideration the crime charged, the possible
defenses, the possible significance of the informer's
testimony, and other relevant factors."
Thus, under the Roviaro test, if the informer was
a participant in the crime or if he is the primary
state witness, his disclosure is material and will be
compelled upon such a motion by the',defense.3
26353 U.S. at 55. The defendant was charged with a
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1956) (repealed by Pub.
L. 91-513, Title III § 1101(a)(2)(4), 84 Stat. 1291
(1970)).
2T 353 U.S. at 56-57.
2 7Id. at 55.
29 Id. at 65. Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, argued
that the Court's holding effectively destroys the role of
informers in effective law enforcement by subjecting
them to possible harm. He also believed that the record
indicated that the defendant knew the informer and
his defense did not require disclosure, since the defend-
ant had not established his claim of entrapment:
A casual reading of the record paints a picture of
one vainly engaging in trial tactics rather than
searching for real defenses--shadowboxing with
the prosecution in a baseless attempt to get a name
that he already had but in reality hoping to get a
reversible error that was nowhere in sight. We
should not encourage such tactics.
Id. at 70.
1O Id. at 60-61.
31 Id. at 62.
2 The Court was unclear in reconciling what alpears
to be not one test, but two-the first of materiality to
the defense, the second one of balancing public interest
against the defendant's rights. Among the variables
discussed, the Court seemed to view the materiality of
[VCol. 64
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Rovia#'o places the burden of showing materiality
on the defendant. In attempting to implement the
decision, both state and federal courts sought to
balance the interests of the state and the accused.
Little uniformity was achieved. Roviaro has often
been limited to its facts and disclosure has been
denied unless the informer was a participant in or
witness to the transaction.3 However, the privilege
disclosure to the defendant as a controlling variable
which would tip the balance toward requiring disclosure.
The decision was based upon a fourterith amend-
ment due process notion of fairness, not the sixth
amendment confrontation right. However, the Court
noted that John Doe was the only witness material to
the defense under the circumstances, and that he was
needed at least for the opportunity of cross-examina-
tion, since his testimony might have disclosed entrap-
ment of the defendant. 353 U.S. at 64.
Although the holding dealt with disclosure hot pro-
duction of a witness, Roviaro has been applied to compel
production of an available informer which the state
does not desire to call as a witness. People v. Scott, 259
Cal. App. 2d 268, 66 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1968); Priestly v.
Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958);
People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958).
Once the Roviaro standard of materiality has been met,
only disclosure is required to avoid dismissal of the
prosecution's case.
1 In California, for example, the privilege was up-
held in People v. Perez, 189 Cal. App. 2d 526, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 456 (1961) (rev'd on other grounds); People v.
Hernandez, 188 Cal. App. 2d 248, 10 Cal Rptr. 267
(1961); People V. Williams, 175 Cal. App. 2d 774, 1
Cal. Rptr. 44 (1959); disclosure was required in cases
cited in note 32 supra. The courts attempted, how-
ever, to decide each case on the issue of mhateriality
of disclosure to the defense.
ilnois courts limited Roviaro to its facts in most
cases and upheld the privilege: People v. Durr, 28 Ill.
2d 308, 192 N.E.2d 379 (1963); People v. Reed, 21 Ill.
2d 416, 173 N.E.2d 442 (1961); People v. Mack, 12 Ill.
2d 151, 145 N.E.2d 609 (1957); People v. Jarrett, 57
Ill. App. 2d 169, 206 N.E.2d 835 (1965): Accord, Dixon
v. State, 39 Ala. App. 575, 105 So. 2d 354 (1958);
State v. Hall, 28 Conn. Sup. 331, 260 A.2d 411 (1969);
State v. Hardy, 114 So. 2d 344 (Fla. App. 1989); Hodges
v. State, 98 Ga. App. 97, 104 S.E.2d 704 (1958).
Federal decisions upholding the informer privilege
after Roviaro include: Lewis v. United Statesi 385 U.S.
206, 210 (1966) (rule virtually prohibiting the use of
informers would "severely hamper the Government"
in enforcement of the narcotics laws); Lannon v.
United States, 381 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1967) cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1041 (1968) (mere speculation that
the informer might possibly be of some assistance is not
sufficient to overcome the public interest in the pro-
tection of the informer); Ruiz v. United States, 380
F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993 (1967);
Ramsey v. United States, 332 F.2d 875, 879 (8th Cir.
1964); Bass v. United States, 326 F.2d 884, 890 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U. S. 905 (1964); Bruner v.
United States, 293 F.2d 621 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 368
U.S. 947 (1961); Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d 279
(5th Cir, 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960);
Pegram v. United States, 267 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1959);
United States v. Rich, 262 F,2d 415 (1959)t United
States v. Carminati, 247 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 883 (1957).
protecting the informer's identity usually gives
way when the defense of entrapment is at issue.4
WiEN TarE INFoRmER TESTiFiES: SMITH
Although Afford v. United States35 had held in
1931 that the right to cross-examination included
the "identification of the witness with his environ-
ment" and that refusal of the court to require a
witness to divulge his address might be prejudicial
error,3" prior to 1968 no court had applied Alford
to the situation when an informer testified as a
state witness3 In Pointek v. Texas- the Supreme
Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 ,(1967), where
the Supreme Court refused to apply the Roviaro ra-
tionale to require disclosure of an informant whose tip
led to a warrantless arrest. The Court reasoned that a
state court is under no absolute duty under either the
fourteenth or sixth amendment to require disclosure of
an informer's identity at a pretrial hearing held for the
purpose of determining only the question of probable
cause for an arrest or search, and where there is ample
evidence that the informer was reliable. 386 U.S. at
302-06. But see Fx. R. Ev. 510 (c) (3) (1971 Revised
Draft). For a complete discussion of the informer
privilege in probable cause cases see Comment, Federal
Jdicial Treatment of Informers-Admissibility, Credi-
bility and Constitutional Considerations, 21 Sw. L.J.
835 (1967); Cbmment, The Informer Privilege in Crimi-
nal Cases, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 665; Comment, Probable
Cause and the Confidential Informer in the United States
Supreme Court, 37 UM.K.C.L. REv. 352 (1969); Comn-
meat, Prosecution's Privilege to Withhold the Identity of
an Informer, 7 WAsHBuRNl L. J. 115, (1967).
1 See note 84 infra; Cotsirilos, Meeting the Prosecu-
tion's Case: Tactics and Strategies of Cross-Examination,
62 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 142, 150-51 (1971).
35 282 U.S, 687 (1931).
36 The question "Where do you live?" is essential to
identify the witness with his environment to facilitate
out-of-court investigation and in-court examination;
the refusal to answer the question was an abuse of the
trial court's discretion and thus prejudicial error. 282
U.S. 693. The Court did not mention the sixth amend-
ment right to confrontation.
37 The esteem in which the early courts held the in-
former privilege is typified by Judge Learned Hand's
discussion in United States v. Easterday, 57 F.2d 165
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 564 (1932), where de-
fendant's conviction for fraudulent use of the mails was
upheld, and the court's failure to require a state witness
to give his present address absent a showing of ma-
teriality was not error:
We are not clear that [Alford v. United States, 282
U.S. 687 (1931)] was intended to be so far an ab-
solute as to yield to no circumstances whatever, or
that no matter how freely the examination may
have ranged, the exclusion of the answer must
invariably result in a reversal .... True, as Alford
v. United States makes plain, it is impossible for a
cross-examiner to declare in advance what he can
prove; he cannot know till he has inquired. Yet it
is fair to ask of him how the question can be rele-
vant; what is the purpose of the inquiry. Cross-
examination should not extend to aimless shots at
random; a trial presupposes rational processes
applied to the testimony uttered. The judge was
1973]
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Court laid the groundwork for such an extension of
Alford by holding that the sixth amendment right
to confrontation, which includes the right of cross-
examination, is a fundamental right essential to a
fair trial and is made obligatory on the states
through the fourteenth amendment. 9
In Smith v. Illinois" the Supreme Court was
faced with a situation where a police informer
testified for the state at trial, but refused to divulge
his true name or address to the defense.41 Without
reference to Roviaro,n the Court further limited the
informer privilege, holding that where the inform-
er's credibility is the main issue in dispute, the
right of confrontation requires the disclosure of the
witness-informer's true name and address.43 In
Smith the defendant was convicted of the unlawful
sale of narcotics. 44 The informer, "James Jordan",
purchased a bag of heroin from the defendant with
police-marked money.45 He testified at trial as the
principal prosecution witness, giving a false name.
4
6
Because his testimony was uncorroborated, the ac-
counts of the transaction by the defendant and the
informer were substantially different, and the rela-
tive credibility of the defendant and the informer
were at issue, the defense moved for disclosure of
the informer's true identity.47
Citing its decision in Alford v. United States and
in Pointer v. Texas, the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that the defendant was de-
prived of his confrontation right under the sixth
and fourteenth amendments. 4 In broad language,
Justice Stewart stated,
[W]hen the credibility of a witness is in issue, the
very starting point in exposing falsehood and
bringing out the truth through cross examination
must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is
and where he lives. The witness' name and address
open countless avenues of in-court examination
not bound to allow what on its face had no bearing
on the witness's credibility; the question was not
inevitably and patently material. The situation
was thus quite different from that in Alford ....
57 F.2d at 166.
s 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
39 Id. at 403.
40 390 U.S. 129 (1968).41 Id. at 130-31.
42 Id. at 133 n.8. The Court stated that Rot'ario was
inapplicable, since in that case the government in-
former was not a witness for the prosecution, a posi-
tion with which this author disagrees.
4Id. at 131.
4Id. at 129.





48 Id. at 133.
and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this
most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effec-
tively to. emasculate the right of cross-examination
itself. 9
Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Marshall,
concurring, argued that inquiries which would en-
danger the witness are not within the bounds of
proper cross-examination. However, in Smith, the
prosecution had not carried its burden of showing
such danger/ 50
The result of the Smith decision was to extend
Roviaro's disclosure requirement as to an informer's
identity beyond transactants and witnesses of the
crime to any informer whose credibility was in
question, regardless of the materiality of his testi-
mony to the defense. No longer was it necessary for
the defense to show the niateriality of the dis-
closure; it had ofily to request identification when
the testimony was uncorroborated.
The credibility requirement of Smith approaches
one of absolute disclosure for the witness-informer.
For example, no informer's testimony in a con-
trolled narcotics buy5' can be completely corrobo-
rated by the police. Thus, the Court uses the dis-
closure requirement either to bar testimony which
would otherwise reach the jury or to break the
informer's cover.
While the facts in Smith were not substantially
different from those in Roviaro, the Court's holding
was broader: the balancing test of materiality was
abandoned for one of the informer's credibility.
Since a portion of the informer's testimony was un-
corroborated-that of the illegal sale itself-"-there
is little doubt that, applying the Roviaro test, dis-
closure would have been required. Yet the Court
went beyond the Roviaro standard to reverse the
conviction. Thus, the burden on the defense to
show materiality, established in Roviaro, has shifted
to the state to show a reason why disclosure should
be refused.m
49 Id. at 131.
51 Id. at 133.
61 See note 17 supra.
52390 U.S. at 130 n.3.
5 Mr. Justice White, concurring, stated:
In Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694
(1931), the Court recognized that questions which
tend merely to harass, annoy, or humiliate a wit-
ness may go beyond the bounds of proper cross-
examination. I would place in the same category
those inquiries which tend to endanger the per-
sonal safety of the witness.
390 U.S. at 133. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, was of
the opinion that the appellant's writ of certiorari was
improvidently granted, and that the record raised
doubts that the appellant was denied information he
did not already have. Id. at 134.
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SHoun TmE BE A DURERENT RULE?
State and federal courts have generally followed
Smith, requiring disclosure of informers unless the
government can show a danger to their personal
safety." The Second and Seventh Circuits are
notable exceptions, however. These circuits favor
application of the Roviaro balancing test.
The Second Circuit, in five cases since Smith was
decided, has refused to overturn convictions in all
five where disclosure of a government witness'
identity or address or both were denied the de-
fendant at trial:5 The decision in United States v.
" In Glover v. State, 253 Ind. 121, 251 N.E.2d
814 (1969), and Nutter v. State, 8 Md. App. 2d 635,
262 A.2d 80 (1970), state courts reversed convictions
where disclosure of a non-witness informer had been
denied. In two California cases, both of which had
prevented disclosure of a witness-informer, one con-
viction was reversed, People v. Brandow, 12 Cal. App.
3d 749, 90 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1970) and one affirmed,
People v. Morales, 263 Cal. App. 2d 368, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 402 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1104 (1969)).
The court in Morales distinguished Smith, stating that
the informer's testimony was corroborated and his
identity was not material to the defense. In six Illi-
nois cases, all of which denied disclosure of a witness-
informer at trial, only People v. Abbott, 110 IlL. App.
2d 462, 249 N.E.2d 675 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
940 (1970), affirmed the conviction. See People v.
West, 3 Ill. App. 3d 106, 278 N.E.2d 233 (1971);
People v. Gonzales, 120 Ill. App. 2d 406, 257 N.E.2d
236 (1970); People v. Dunams, 118 Ill. App. 2d 76,
254 N.E.2d 582 (1969); People v. Shaw, 117 Il. App.
2d 16, 254 N.E.2d 602 (1969); People v. Hall, 117
Ill. App. 2d 116, 253 N.E. 2d 890 (1969).
See also the following federal cases: Sixth Circuit-
United States v. Pegram, 423 F.2d 904, 912 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970); (conspiracy, burglary,
and interstate transportation of goods stolen from
United States post offices affirmed); Phillips v. Neil,
452 F.2d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 1971) (reversed). Eighth
Circuit-United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288, 296
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972) (bank
robbery conviction affirmed); United States v. Dick-
ens,. 417 F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1969) (conviction for pos-
session of stolen property reversed); Kirschbaum v.
United States, 407 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1969) (inter-
state transportation, sale and distribution of lewd
films affirmed). Ninth Circuit-Vanhook v. Craven, 419
F.2d 1295, 1296 (9th Cir. 1969) (sale of marijuana
reversed); United States v. Kartman, 417 F.2d 893,
897 (9th Cir. 1969) (assaulting federal marshall re-
versed); United States v. Norman, 402 F.2d 73 76
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 938 (1969) &vio-
lation of narcotics laws affirmed). Tenth Circuit-
United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F.2d 516, 519 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972) (conspiracy
to defraud F.H.A. affirmed); Sinclair v. Turner, 447
F.2d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1048 (1972) (affirmed).
15 United States v. Kaufman 429 F.2d 240 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 4970); United States
v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 869 (1970); United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d
1263 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds; United
States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
Persico16 typifies the court's reasoning in all five
decisions. The defendant, convicted of robbery of
interstate merchandise, argued that the court's re-
fusal to allow disclosure of the addresses of two
government witnesses violated his sixth amend-
ment right to confrontation under Smith v. Illinois
and Alford v. United States. The Second Circuit held
that no violation of the defendant's confrontation
right had occurred where (1) the informers' lives
had been threatened, (2) the witnesses were well-
known to the defendant who had an adequate op-
portunity to inquire into their backgiound on cross-
examination and (3) the defense showed no particu-
larized need for disclosure.Y
The Seventh Circuit has dealt with tle witness-
informer question in eleven cases,- and has upheld
the informer privilege in nine of them. Following
the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of the defendant's
conviction for possession and sale of narcotics,
5 9
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded United
States v. Garafalo,60 in light of Smith; on remand
the Seventh Circuit reversed.6 Since then, that
court has refused to extend Smith, consistently
applying Justice White's exception when the in-
former's life appears to be in danger.6
2 The Fifth
denied, 397 U.S. 976 (1970); United States v. Bennett,
409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852
(1969).
56 425 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
869 (1970).
67 425 F.2d at 1384.
58 United States v. Saletko, 452 F.2d 193, 195 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040 (1972); United
States v. Caldarazzo, 444 F.2d 1046, 1050 (7th Cir.
1971); United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119,
1128 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971);
United States v. Battaglia, 432 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971); United States
v. Lee, 413 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1022 (1970); United States v. Lawler, 413
F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046
(1970); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468 (7th
Cir. 1969), remanded on other grounds; United States v.
Teller, 412 F.2d 374, 380 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 949 (1971) (Smith does not per se require a
new trial merely because the district court sustained an
objection to a question seeking to elicit Washington's
address. Smith requires reversal only where the lack
of a witness's name and address denies a defendant an
opportunity to effectively cross-examine a witness);
United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 749 (7th Cir.
1969).
But see United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 511
(7th Cir. 1968) (under Smith and Alford the court
should have compelled the witness to state her present
address).
59 385 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1967).
390 U.S. 144 (1968).
61396 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. 1968).
2Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 133 (1968)
(White and Marshall, 33., concurring).
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Circuit may also be returning to the Roviaro
approach.
In a recent decision, United States v. Alston,63
the Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction for the il-
legal sale of heroin, holding that the trial court
properly refused a defense request for disclosure of
a government agent-witness' present address,
when his life and his family's safety might have
been in danger.
... [I]t appears to us that the purpose of Alford/
Smith was to safeguard the opportunity for a mean-
ingful and open cross-examination, not to require
that a witness always divulge his or her home ad-
dress. Alford and Smith do not erect a per se re-
quirement that a witness's home address be di-
vulged upon demand ....
Nonetheless, some states have enacted the Smith
rationale into their criminal discovery procedures,65
and the Federal Rules of Evidence abolish the
privilege of an informer by requiring absolute dis-
closure when he testifies as a witness."
The Supreme Court's distinction between Ro-
viaro and Smith-that one decision involves an out-
of-court and the other an in-court informer7-
seems hollow, since in each case the issue was the
same: weighing the government's privilege against
61460 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1972).
64 Id. The court cited Justice White's concurring
opinion in Smith. It distinguished the case from Smith
on the ground that here the defendant could suffi-
ciently "place the witness" by information available
on the witness's occupation as a federal narcotics
agent. The court also held that even if failure to dis-
close constituted error, it was nonetheless harmless.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1966); FED.
R. Cams. P. 52 (a).
65 See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R., 412(j)(ii) (1971), ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §412j)(ii) (1971):
Informants. Disclosure of an informant's identity
shall not be required where his identity is a prose-
cution secret and a failure to disclose will not
infringe the constitutional rights of the accused.
Disclosure shall not be denied hereunder of the
identity of witnesses to be produced at a hearing or
trial.
66 Fz. R. Ev. 510(c)(1) (1971 Revised Draft);
Cf. MODEL CODE OF EvmEzcE rule 230 (1942):
A witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose the
identity of a person who has furnished information
purporting to disclose a violation of a provision
of the laws of this State or of the United States to
a representative of the State or the United States
or a governmental division thereof, charged with
the duty of enforcing that provision, and evidence
thereof is inadmissible, unless the judge finds that
(a) the identity of the person furnishing the in-
formation has already been otherwise disclosed, or
(b) disclosure of his identity is essential to assure a
fair determination of the issues.
67 390 U.S. at 133 n.8.
the defendant's need for disclosure of the inform-
er's identity and address. Many courts have ap-
plied a uniform rule to both situations, but they
disagree upon which rule should be applied. Some
apply the sixth amendment confrontation require-
ment addressed in Smith to achieve disclosure of
informers in all cases."' Others, recognizing the need
to protect the informer have continued to apply
Roviaro's balancing standard whether or not the
informer testifies.19 These Courts argue that uncor-
roborated testimony is not by itself inadmissible,
but should go to the trier of fact for determination
of its credibility. Uncorroborated testimony of a
witness-informer should not require absolute dis-
closure in cases where such disclosure is not ma-
terial to the defense; the burden should remain on
the defense to establish a minimum level of ma-
teriality before disclosure is allowed.70
In two cases dealing with the sixth amendment
right to confrontation, the Supreme Court has
recognized exceptions for admitting hearsay testi-
mony. California v. GreenO held that the confronta-
tion clause is not violated by admitting a declar-
ant's out-of-court statements as long as the de-
clarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full
and effective cross-examination. Dutton v. Evans72
held that a Georgia statute which admitted a co-
conspirator's out-of-court statement inculpating
the defendant did not violate the right to con-
frontation. A state may enact a co-conspirator
hearsay exception different from the federal stand-
ard.73 Perhaps a similar exception to the con-
frontation right is necessary where disclosure might
subject the informer to harm, but would not be
material to the defense.
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in both Green74
and Dtton,5 argued that the sixth amendment
right to confrontation does not necessarily include
the right to cross-examination, but only requires
that the government produce its available wit-
nesses. He would apply a fourteenth amendment
due process standard to cases involving the de-
fendant's right to cross-examination. 76 Irrespec-
"See cases cited note 54 supra.
"See cases cited note 33 supra.
10 See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 134 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53, 70 (1957) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
71399 U.S. 149 (1970).
72 400 U.S. 74 (1970).73 Id. at 83.
74 399 U.S. at 172.
7 400 U.S. at 93.
76 The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
reaches no farther than to require the prosecution
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tive of whether the confrontation clause includes
the right of cross-examination, n many courts
have since suggested that a broad, effective cross-
examination may be had by the defendant without
ordering disclosure of the informer's identity or
address 8
THE COMPETING INTERESTS
In balancing the public interest in law enforce-
ment against the defendant's right to prepare an
adequate defense, two competing dangers are
involved: danger to the informer and danger to the
defendant. The danger of disclosure to the safety
of the informer was recognized by Mr. Justice
White in his concurring opinion in Smith. 9 He
would limit nondisclosures to inquiries which tend
to endanger the witness and are not within the
bounds of proper cross-examination. Many juris-
to produce any available witness whose declara-
tions it seeks to use in a criminal trial.... This is
not to say that the right to cross-examine is not an
element of due process.
399 U.S. at 174, 186 n.20. See also 390 U.S. at 134
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
See generally Garland & Snow, The Co-conspirator's
Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Procedural Implementa-
tlion and Confrontation Clause Requirements, 63 J.
CpIW. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1972).
,7 The broad latitude of cross-examination pre-
scribed in Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931),
was not based on the sixth amendment right to con-
frontation.
78 See 390 U.S. 129, 133 (1968) (White and Marshall,
JJ., concurring); United States v. Alston, 460 F.2d 51
(5th Cir. 1972); cases cited notes 55 and 58 supra.
79 Id.
Proponents of Smnith might ask if production of the
informer at trial does not reveal his identity to the
defense and subject him to possible harm regardless of
whether his true name and address are disclosed. In a
public trial in a small town such production might aid a
vengeful defendant in determining the informer's
whereabouts. In the smaller community, the narcotics
informer may be used only once-to facilitate a mass
arrest. He is the transactant and chief witness, and
often identifiable to all defendants. No an0nymous
undercover agents exist to corroborate his testimony or
protect his privilege. Production alone may reveal
his identity. Although the need for informers is not
as great in small towns, the state ought to be permitted
both to refrain from disclosure where 1) the witness-
informer's life is in danger and 2) the defendant can-
not show the materiality of his disclosure, and to
refrain from production at all when the informer's
testimony is not necessary to the prosecution's case.
In large cities, where the interest in the informer
privilege is arguably greater, the privilege coupled
with police protection prevents the defendant or his
associates from locating the informer outside of the
courtroom. Thus, the denial of disclosure of his true
name and address is important, notwithstanding pro-
duction at trial. Another question half-seriously raised
is whether a mask or bag placed over a witness-in-
former's head violates the defendant's right to con-
frontation,
dictions, by court decision8' or by statute,"L employ
an h caittera hearing to determine the probable
danger to the informer by requiring his disclosure.
Under the Roviaro standard the possible danger to
the informer is a factor to be considered in the bal-
ancing test and must be weighed against the ma-
teriality of disclosure to the defense.
The primary danger which the privilege poses to
the defendant is the absence of protection from en-
trapment by police and informer.82 Entrapment
may be induced by the informer without the police's
knowledge or consent; thus the need exists for ab-
solute police surveillance and corroboration of the
informer's testimony as required by Smith. Dis-
closure has little practical effect on either impeach-
ment in the courtroom or investigation outside
when there has been extensive cross-examination of
the informer as to his background and association
with the accused," but it is necessary to support a
defense of entrapment. If properly carried out,
police surveillance of an informer to establish a
complete chain of custody of the evidence and pro-
vide absolute corroboration of an informer's testi-
mony could render his identification useless to the
defense. Unfortunately, such intensive police sur-
veillance is uncommon, and entrapment may occur
against innocent defendants8 4
THE RETURN To RovrmRo: ExCEPTIoNs To SanTli
An exception to the Smith requirement of dis-
closure for a failure of corroboration is People v.
80 Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 133 (1968) (White
and Marshall, JJ., concurring); Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966) (trial court may not grant
an ex parte order requiring disclosure without a hearing
on the facts); United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468
(7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d
735 (7th Cir. 1969); State v. Denato, 173 N.W.2d
576 (Iowa 1970).
8"See, e.g., CA. Evm. CODE § 1042(d) (West 1969);
cf. FED. R. Ev. 510(c)(2) (1971 Revised Draft).
81 "Entrapment" is the act of officers or agents of
the government in inducing a person to commit a
crime not contemplated by him, for the purpose of
instituting a criminal piosecution against him. ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-12 (1969).
8See, e.g., People v. Abbott, 110 Ill. App. 2d 462,
249 N.E.2d 675 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940
(1970). The Rotiaro test, properly applied, should
enable disclosure when a good faith entrapment de-
fense is raised, while preventing disclosure when the
defendant has had sufficient cross-examination to
enable the jury to try the issue of the informer's
credibility.
84 The controlled buy procedure itself borders closely
on entrapment and the defense need to explore all
avenues of impeachment of the informer's credibility
cannot be underestimated. See Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, J., con-
curring); Donnelly, supra note 17, at 1094, 1098 (temp-
tation to "frame" a case is great).
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Abbott.15 Here the defendant's conviction for illegal
sale of heroin was affirmed,86 notwithstanding the
defendant's argument that the failure of the in-
former to disclose his true name and address vio-
lated the defendant's sixth amendment confronta-
tion right and the dictates of Smith v. Illinois7
The defendant was introduced by the informer,
Harry Schwartz, a known addict, to "Danny", a
plain clothes policeman, who made three subse-
quent controlled purchases from the defendant and
was the state's primary witness. s The defense ar-
gued that such disclosure was necessary to its
affirmative defense of entrapment"9 since the prose-
cution and defense accounts of the facts concerning
the transaction differed, and the informer's testi-
mony was, therefore, subject to impeachment."
The defense also argued that the trial judge had
erroneously ordered the informer not to divulge his
name and address for his own safety. The order was
entered without an in camera showing by the state
that the informer was in any danger. 9'
The state argued that Smith did not apply where
the informer was not the principal prosecution wit-
ness, his credibility was not at issue, and his testi-
mony was corroborated by another witness.9 The
Illinois appellate court held that:
[Tihe extent of cross-examination of the informer
with respect to his correct name and address was
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
the court exercised reasonable judgment in sustain-
ing the objection of the State. The informer's
background, with the exception of his true name
and current address, was known to the defendant.
The jury was adequately informed about the in-
former so as to form an opinion as to his credibil-
ity.93
85 110 Ill. App. 2d 462, 249 N.E.2d 675 (1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970).861d. at 468-69, 249 N.E.2d at 678. On April 9,
1971, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois denied a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. On March 27, 1972, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial,
United States ex rd. Abbott v. Twomey, 460 F. 2d 400
(7th Cir. 1972). The Seventh Circuit subsequently de-
nied appellant's petition for rehearing en banc in an
unreported opinion of April 25, 1972.
8 110 Ill. App. 2d at 466, 249 N.E.2d at 677.
88 Id. at 464, 249 N.E.2d at 676.
89 See notes 82-84 supra.
9B 110 Ill. App. 2d at 469-70, 249 N.E.2d at 678-79.
Brief for Defendant at 10-11. The defendant aigued
that the informer had induced him to sell drugs to the
undercover policeman by feigning sickness and with-
drawal symptoms, an allegation which the state de-
nied.
91 Brief for Defendant at 16.
92 110 Ill. App. 2d at 468, 249 N.E.2d at 678. State's
brief at 6-10.
. 9 110 Il. App. 2d at 469, 249 N.E.2d at 678.
The court stated that the defendant was ade-
quately informed about the informer's background
to explore the avenues of in-court examination and
out-of-court investigation described in Ayord v.
United States, and upheld the trial court's deter-
mination that the informer's life was in danger.9 4
The court found that disclosure of the informer's
true name and address would not add to the de-
fense when it had already established on cross-ex-
amination that the informer was an addict and a
convicted felon.99 These disclosures, reasoned the
court, were sufficient background to establish the
question of his credibility in the minds of the jury. 8
The defendant's knowledge of and association with
the informer were sufficient to identify him with
his environment for the puprose of investigation,
cross-examination and impeachment. 97
While noting the factual differences between
Smith and Abbott,98 the decision did not discuss the
three distinctions posed by the prosecution-that
the informer was not the primary state witness,
that his credibility was not at issue, and that his
testimony was corroborated. The court cited Smith
v. Illinois, but decided the case on the basis of ade-
quate available evidence to reach the jury on the
issue of the informer's credibility, without requiring
disclosure. Implicit in the court's opinion, although
it did not discuss Roviaro, is the notion that, in
Abbott, disclosure of the informer's identity was not
material to the defense. 99 Thus, disregarding the
Supreme Court's distinction of the two cases on the
basis of whether the informer appears as a state
witness, the reasoning of the decision is closer to
the rationale of Roviaro than that of Smith. The
Illinois appellate court in effect applied the
Roviaro test by basing the disclosure requirement
not on the credibility of the informer's testimony,
but rather on the materiality of who he is or what
he may say. 00 The court shifted the burden of proof
4 think that the question of his address is not ma-
terial and would only subject the witness to a pos-
sible disclosure as to his whereabouts, and for
informing and testifying in this case, his life
definitely would be in jeopardy and it is because
of the fact his life would be in jeopardy in disclos-
ing his address, the Court would refuse to permit
the information-to be divulged at this time.
110 Ill. App. 2d at 466, 249 N.E.2d at 677.
95 Id.
96 110 Ill. App. 2d at 469, 249 N.E.2d at 678.
97 110 Ill. App. 2d at 464, 469, 249 N.E.2d at 676,
678.
9 110 Ill. App. 2d at 468, 249 N.E.2d at 678.
91 110 Ill. App. 2d at 469-70, 249 N.E.2d at 679.
100 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61 (1957);
People v. Morales, 263 Cal. App. 2d 368, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 402 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1104 (1969).
See also cases cited note 34 supra.
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from a state showing of why the informer's identity
should not be disclosed to a defense showing of
why it should."'
In denying appellants' petition for habeas corpus
relief, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Since Schwartz was not a principal prosecution
witness and since his testimony was not crucial to
the defense, the real issue at the trial was not the
credibility of Schwartz. We hold that the Smith
ruling on disclosure of the witness-informer's true
identity is not applicable to the case at bar.
In a situation somewhat analogous to the case
at bar concerning suppression of an informer's
true identity, the Supreme Court has decided
that the identity of a non-witness narcotics in-
former need not always be disclosed to the defend-
ant. [Citing Roviaro v. United States]... tWihere
an informer is not the principal witness testifying
against an accused, a trial judge must weigh the
policy considerations for nondisclosure of identity
of said informer so aptly stated by the Supreme
Court in Roviaro.... We are of the opinion that
the Smith rule should not be extended to reveal
every informant's true identity where the informer
is not the principal witness against the accused
102
CONCLUSION
The Abbott case is but an example of the reasoned
refusal of some state and federal courts to extend
the Smith requirement to one of absolute disclosure.
Though the number of such decisions is not large,
it may represent a turn away from Smith and back
to Romiaro. The court's decision in Abbott raises
again the question posed by the dissenters in
Roviaro and Smith"-how vital is disclosure to the
defendant in each case? The Abbott court held that
this question can best be answered by applying the
balancing test elicited in Roviaro, and rejected an
absolute rule. 3' The disclosure requirement de-
pends upon the circumstances of the case and the
materiality of the informer's testimony to the de-
fense. Identification ought to be required only when
it will aid the accused in securing a fair trial.
The public policy need to protect informers is
M Cf. United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468, 472
(7th Cir. 1969), and United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d
735, 750 (7th Cir. 1969), where the state established
a threat to the informer's life and the defense was
required to show materiality of disclosure, per Justice
White's concurring opinion in Smith.
102 United States ex re. Abbott v. Twomey, 460
F.2d 400, 402-04 (7th Cir. 1972).
in 353 U.S. 53, 70 (1957) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
390 U.S. 129, 134 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14 United States ex re. Abbott v. Twomey, 460 F.2d
400, 402-04 (7th Cir. 1972).
arguably great, especially where their safety is in
jeopardy."'5 However, the trend of both the judici-
ary and legislatures after Smith. v Illinois has been
to treat disclosure as a near-absolute component of
the right to confrontation. 06 New criminal discov-
ery rules in some jurisdictions have followed the
Smith rationale, thus limiting the informer privi-
lege."07
Rule 510 of the new Federal Rules of Evidence,
promulgated by the Supreme Court on November
20,1972, and effective in all federal courtsof appeals
and district courts on July 1, 1973, codifies the
common law government privilege to withhold an
informer's identity; however, the rule also provides
the following exception to the informer privilege:
No privilege exists under this rule... if the in-
former appears as a witness for the government. 10'
Thus, the rule requires absolute disclosure in all
federal courts of a witness-informer, regardless of
materiality to the defense. The committee com-
ments do not provide adequate support for this
clear extension of the Smith holding." 9
Until now, many courts have been unwilling to
1"5 See 8 WiGmoRE § 2374; M. HAumv & J. CRoss,
supra note 17; Donnelly, supra note 17. In Gutteman,
supra note 17, at 63, the author states:
Any defense of the informer privilege must unques-
tionably accept the view that the informant is
vital in society's constant effort to combat crime.
Once this view is accepted, the assured anonymity
of the informant appears as the only effective
method of preserving the informant system and of
protecting those individuals who have participated
in the process.
But at times, fundamental concepts of fairness
may necessitate the disclosure of the informant.
The principal pronouncement in Rodiaro, that the
informer privilege is not absolute but is subject
to a balancing test, has met with begrudging
acceptance.
"'8 See cases cited note 54 supra.
107See. e.g., ItL. Sup. CT. R. 412(j)(ii) (1971), IL.
REV. STAT., ch. 110A, §412 ()(ii) (1971).
"' FED. R. Ev. 510(c)(1) (1971 Revised Draft).
109 The Advisory Committee's Note states:
If the informer becomes a witness, the interests of
justice in disclosing his status as a source of bias
are believed to outweigh any remnant of interest
in nondisclosure which then remains.
51 F.R.D. 315, 380 (1971).
The Committee cites Harris v. United States, 371
F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1967) as authority for this proposed
statutory exception to the informer privilege. However,
in Harris the issue was not disclosure of the informer's
identity or address, but only a wide latitude of cross-
examination concerning the witness-informer's back-
ground and his relationship with the government-an
issue addressed by the Supreme Court as early as
Alford v. United States. Thus, Harris provides in-
adequate support for Rule 510(c)(1).
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extend the Simith rule to this extreme. Within a
very few months these courts must determine
whether to abandon the established Roviaro bal-
ancing test or to disregard the absolute disclosure
requirement of the Federal Rules. The resolution of
the vital, though competing interests involved in
disclosure decisions requires a balancing approach
and a case-by-case analysis, not an absolutely
rigid rule. Thus, even if the federal courts are
[Vol. 64
bound by the new Federal Rules of Evidence to
require disclosure of the identity of every informer
who testifies for the government, they ought still to
refuse disclosure of his address when the govern-
ment can show potential danger to the informer and
the defense fails to show materiality. On the other
hand, state courts are not bound by the Federal
Rules and ought to reject absolute disclosure in
favor of the Roviaro balancing test.
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COMPLAINANT CREDIBILITY IN SEXUAL OFFENSE CASES:
A SURVEY OF CHARACTER TESTIMONY AND PSYCHIATRIC EXPERTS
The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex
incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and
convincing. The victim, however, too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy
naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.'
INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators have found that
sexual offense accusations are oftentimes false and
frequently are made by psychologically disturbed
individuals. Corroborative proof of a sex crime is
an inappropriate safeguard against a conviction
based on a possibly false accusation because the
secluded nature of most sexual offenses makes the
occurrence and discovery of such evidence a near
impossibility. To protect the falsely accused, while
avoiding the prosecutorial burden of corrobora-
tion, the courts have admitted a wide range of
character testimony concerning a complainant's
sexual reputation. Such testimony is intended
either to impeach the credibility or to corroborate
the testimony of the complainant.
A preferable safeguard for the falsely accused is
the use of psychiatrists to examine a complainant
and then testify to the various factors relating to
the complainant's credibility in making a sex
assault charge. The detection of personality traits
which lead one falsely to accuse another of a sexual
offense is uniquely within the province of psychi-
atry. The courts have admitted such testimony,
but only when a judge believes a complainant may
be perjuring himself. This limitation denies expert
testimony when it is most needed. If the com-
plainant's credibility appears doubtful to a judge,
a jury would probably also detect and appropri-
ately weigh it. However, in a particularly subtle
case, dangerous because of a complainant's "nor-
mal" appearance, a psychiatrist is not used because
the judge is unable to detect the complainant's
untruthfulness. It is in this latter class of cases
where a psychiatrist is most helpful; for he is
equipped to discover those psychological factors
which are indicative of a falsifying but outwardly
truthful complainant and which are unknown and
unrevealed to a judge.
This comment is addressed to the inadequacy
13 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 924(a) (3d ed, 1940)
[hereinafter cited as WxauoR].
and impropriety of using complainant character
evidence to protect the falsely accused in sexual
offense cases. It will also analyze the bases for
admitting expert psychiatric testimony to reveal
those traits in a complainant which may have
prompted a false accusation in a sexual offense
case.
THE Con.BonRTioN REQUmEMENT
Empirical evidence supports the courts'2 and
commentators'3 beliefs that many sex offense
complaints are false. In one study4 of sexual offense
assaults,5 nineteen percent of the complaints were
discovered to be unfounded. Even in those cases
where the complainant showed physical injury
supposedly inflicted during an assault, seven per-
2 U~nited States v. Terry, 422 F.2d 704, 705 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131,
1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Ballard v. Superior Court,
64 Cal. 2d 159, 170-71, 410 P.2d 838, 846-47, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (1966); People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal. App.
2d 334, 338, 333 P.2d 82, 85 (1958); Burton v. State,
232 Ind. 246, 249-50, 111 N.E.2d 892, 893-94 (1953).
33 W GmoE §924(a); DeFrancis, Protecting the
Child Victim of Sex Crimes by Adults, 35 FED. PROB. 15,
19 (1971); Juviler, Psychiatric Opinions as to Credibility
of Witnesses: A Suggested Approach, 48 CAxw. L. REv.
648, 674 (1960); Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American
Legal Context, 25 LAW & CoNTmp,. PROB. 217, 223
(1960); Weihofen, Testimonial Competency and Credibil-
ity, 34 Gao. WAsn. L. Rnv. 53, 73-74 (1965); Note,
Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 Com!. L. REv. 1137,
1138 (1967); Note, Psychiatric Testimony for the Im-
peachment of Witnesses in Sex Cases, 39 J. Can. L. C. &
P.S. 750, 752 (1949); Comment, The Corroboration
Ride and Crimes Accompanying A Rape, 118 U. PA. L.
REV. 458, 460 (1970); Comment, Forcible and Statutory
Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives
of the Consent Standard, 62 YAE L.J. 55, 56 (1952);
Recent Cases, Psychiatric Aid in Evaluating the Credi-
bility of a Prosecuting Witness Charging Rape, 26 1".
L.J. 98, 101 (1952).4 Schiff Statistical Features of Rape, 14 J. FOR. 5cr.
102, 109 (1969).
5This comment applies broadly to all felonious
forcible sexual offenses. However, the discussion often
focuses on forcible rape because it has been the subject
of the most empirical study and commentary. This is
particularly true when the discussion turns to charac-
ter impeachment. Sec text accompanying notes 22 et.
seq., infra.
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cent of the complaints were found to be untrue,
and another fifteen percent questionable.' In a
Philadelphia rape study, twenty percent of the
cases were concluded to be unfounded after in-
vestigation.Y It is difficult to insure that a defend-
ant is not wrongly convicted on the basis of a
false accusation because of the problems with
material corroboration in sex offense cases.
Material corroboration8 in sexual offense cases
is extremely difficult to obtain. 9 Requiring corrob-
6 Schiff, supra note 4, at 108.
Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgement That
a Crime Has Been Committed-Rape in Philadelphia,
117 PA. L. Rxv. 277, 280-81 (1968). The author re-
ported that some police investigators believed 80% to
90% of rape reports were false. In Lear, Q. If You Rape
a Woman and Steal Her TV, What Can They Get You
for in New York? A. Stealing Her TV, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 30, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 55, the author quotes
Detective Al Simon of the New York City Police De-
partment as saying, "A lot of officers, especially the
old timers, believe that unless a woman comes in
bruised, there's no rape. They also say, unless the
woman's a virgin, what's the big deal?"
8 For purposes of this comment, material corrobora-
tion is evidence, other than the complainant's testi-
mony, that a sexual offense took place, and from which
a trier of fact could infer guilt, or evidence which adds
sufficient weight to the complainant's testimony so
that the danger of false accusation is removed. Cases
illustrative of the presence or absence of material
corroboration are: United States v. Terry, 422 F.2d 704
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (bruises on prosecutrix face and thigh
corroborative proof); Coltrane v. United States, 418
F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (corroboration need not be
direct, may be circumstantial; however, finding an
empty vaseline jar in wastebasket in defendant's room
similar to the jar described by the complainant insuffi-
cient); People v. Scott, 407 Ill. 301, 95 N.E.2d 315
(1950) (evidence that the complainant had gone will-
ingly to the defendant's apartment, and voluntarily
though reluctantly consented to sexual relations im-
peached the prosecutrix); People v. Thompson, 121 Ill.
App. 2d 163, 257 N.E.2d 197 (1970) (spermatozoa in
vagina and on panties insufficient to corroborate com-
plainant's identification of defendant, whom complain-
ant only saw for ten seconds); People v. Radunovic, 21
N.Y.2d 186, 234 N.E.2d 212, 287 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967)
(bruises on thigh and recently broken hymen insufficient
corroboration); People v. Masse 5 N.Y.2d 217, 156
N.E.2d 452, 182 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1959) (complainant's
testimony that she threw jewelry box at the defendant
was corroborated by broken window and defendant's
retrieving box); Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape,
supra note 3; Comment, The Corroboration Rule and
Crimes Accompanying A Rape, supra note 3; Note,
Criminal Law -Corroboration Held Necessary to Prove
Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree Where Underlying Act
Is Rape--People v. Boyle, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rtv. 1025
(1969).
9 Ludwig, The Case for Repeal of the Sex Corroboration
Requirement in New York, 36 BxooxLsN L. REv. 378
(1970); Note, Criminal Law-Corroboration Held
Necessary to Prove Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree
Where the Underlying Act is Rape--People v. Doyle,
supra note 8. Both of those commentaries discuss the
1967 New York rape law which had a vigorous corrobo-
ration requirement, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.15 (McKin-
orative proof of a complainant's testimony often
places an insurmountable burden on the prosecu-
tion. 0 This situation is caused by the unique fac-
tual circumstances inherent in forcible sexual
offenses. The legality of the acts involved fre-
quently depends upon the intent of the parties,
and not necessarily the nature of the act. The
circumstances leading up to a sex act itself are
often highly discreet and surrounded by privacy,
particularly where there is a background of famil-
iarity between the parties.n The final result of the
parties' familiarities may be a brutal rape or a
fanciful tale relating an imagined rape. In either
ney 1967). Since that time New York has revised its
rape laws, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.15 (McKinney Supp.
1972). The comments following the new statute indicate
an intention to modify the strict requirements for cor-
roboration of the older law. Whether they actually will
is not clear at this time. For a comment on the new law,
see Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal
Not Reform, 81 YALE L. J. 1365 (1972).
10 Because of the difficulty of obtaining material cor-
roboration in New York, see note 9 supra, New York
prosecutors at one time followed the practice of reduc-
ing the charge against an accused to an offense not
requiring corroboration when corroborative proof was
not available. Ludwig, supra note 9. See Note, Corrobo-
rating Charges of Rape, supra note 3; Note, Criminal
Law--Corroboration Held Necessary to Prove Sexual
Abuse in the Third Degree Where the Underlying Act is
Rape--People v. Doyle, supra note 8; Comment, The
Corroborative Rule and Crimes Accompanying Rape,
supra note 3, at 462-63. The New York courts then
specifically prohibited the practice. See People v.
Radunovic, 21 N.Y.2d 186, 234 N.E.2d 212, 287
N.Y.S.2d 33 (1967); People v. English, 16 N.Y.2d 719,
209 N.E.2d 722, 262 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965); People v.
LoVerde, 7 N.Y.2d 114, 164 N.E.2d 102, 195 N.Y.S.2d
835 (1959). The New York legislature codified the
actions of the court of appeals in N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.15 (McKinney 1967) (Practice Commentary at
278-79). That high burden of corroborative proof made
obtaining a conviction for rape in New York practically
impossible. According to Ludwig, supra note 9, at 386,
between the time the 1967 statute went into effect and
the time he wrote his article in 1970, not a single con-
viction for a sexual offense felony in Queens County,
New York was obtained. Lear, supra note 7, noted that,
while the national conviction rate for rape was 36%,
in New York the rate was 3.9%. Lear also attributed
the low conviction rate to the stringent corroboration
requirement. The effect of the new statute, N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 130.15 (McKinney Supp. 1972), is unclear but
in the opinion of at least one commentator, Note, The
Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform,
supra note 9, at 1370-72, the new statute is more a
"tactical retreat from an extreme form of corroboration"
than an elimination of the corroboration requirement
altogether. That is, under the new statute it is still very
conceivable that the amount of corroboration the
statute demands would often be unavailable.
11 Amir, Victim Precipitated Rape, 58 J. Cmm. L.C. &
P.S. 493, 500 Table I (1966), noted that in approxi-
mately 50% of the rape cases he studied, the victim and
the offender knew each other prior to the offense.
[Vol. 64
COMPLAINANT CREDIBILITY
event, the only evidence as to what actually oc-
curred is the testimony of the involved parties.
Even when the crime does not involve a back-
ground of familiarity, sexual offenses are often not
witnessed" and other forms of corroborative evi-
dence are lacking. Evidence may be lost because
the crime is not immediately reported." Often no
witnesses are available because the victim, out of
fear for his or her life, makes no outcry.14 Since
such an assult is so often emotion-charged, a
legitimate victim's story may become confused
and of little investigatory use to the police who
must obtain the corroborative evidence.'5
Often, therefore, the only evidence of a sex
crime is the complainant's testimony. Because of
this, the majority of states follow the common-law
rule that the uncorroborated testimony of a com-
plainant is sufficient to support a conviction if the
complainant's testimony is credible. 6 Other juris-
dictions require so little corroboration that the
result is virtually the same as the common-law
rule 7
Because corroboration is not mandatory, a trier
of fact must convict an accused when presented
with a complainant who has a credible and irref-
utable story." Given the likelihood of undetected
false accusations, without some form of safeguards
innocent persons might be convicted. Since such
a dilemma arises because the complainant's ap-
parently credible story may actually be false,
protective devices other than material corrobora-
tion have arisen.
"H. KALvEN & H. ZFISEL, THE AmmcAN Juav
142 (1966). Table 40 shows.that eyewitnesses were
present in only 4% of the rape cases studied.
" Comment, supra note 7, at 282-86. The author
noted that investigators of rape reports consider the
promptness with which an alleged offense is reported as
highly important in determining whether a crime ac-
tually took place.
"4 In the author's interviews with investigators from
the Chicago Police Department Criminal Investigation
Unit, 6th Area, on May 10, 1972, they indicated their
belief that this factor was common in rape cases.
15 Id.
16 7 WiGmoan § 2061 and cases cited therein. Four
states by statute require corroborative proof in addi-
tion to the complainant's testimony in order to support
a rape conviction: GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (rev. ed.
1971); IDAho PENA, & CoRR. CODE § 18-907(4) (Supp.
1971); IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (1950); N.Y. PEnAL
LAw § 130.15 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
7 See 7 Wixop § 2061; Note, Psychiatric Examina-
tion of Prosecutrix in Rape Case, 45 N.C.L. Rnv. 234,
237 (1966).
18 See 3 WiGMoRE § 424(a); Juviler, supra note 3, at
674; Comment, The Corroboration Rule and Crimes
Accompanying Rape, supra note 3, at 459-61.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE
The danger of wrongful conviction in sexual
offense cases arises because the possibility of false
accusation is acute and the defendant may be
unable to disprove such falsehoods. To mitigate
that danger, courts in sexual offense cases admit a
wider range of character testimony to impeach or
corroborate a complainant than is normally al-
lowed. 9 In most criminal cases, character evidence
is limited to the witness' general reputation for
truthfulness." In sexual offense cases, the com-
plainant is often both the chief witness and the
victim. Consequently, evidence is admitted con-
cerning both the complainant's general reputation
for truthfulness and for past sexual activity."
Because consent is often the issue in sexual
offense cases," it is the primary focus of the char-
acter evidence offered by a defendant. Such evi-
dence frequently attempts to show that the com-
plainant has a general reputation for sexual per-
missiveness, the inference being: "If she's done it
once, she'll do it again." 2 Such evidence is con-
sidered relevant as circumstantial evidence corrob-
orating the defense that the complainant consented
to the sexual act. The underlying justification for
19 See People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal. App. 2d 334, 333
P.2d 82 (1958) People v. Furrah, 146 Cal. App. 2d 740,
304 P.2d 849 (1956); Edmondson v. State, 146 So. 2d
395 (Fla. 1962); People v. Gersbacher, 44 Ill. 2d 321,
255 N.E.2d 429 (1970); People v. Collins, 25 Ill. 2d
605, 186 N.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 942 (1963);
1 WiGMoRE §§ 62, 200; C. McCoRmCK, HANDBOOK ON
TE LAw OF EvDxE, §§ 155, 157-58 (1954); FED. R.
Ev. 404, 608, and accompanying Advisory Committee's
notes (1971 Revised Draft); Juviler, supra note 3;
Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment
of Witnesses, 52 Comma L L.Q. 239, 241 (1967); Ladd,
Technique and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IowA
L. Rsv. 498, 514 (1939); Comment, Forcible and Stat-
utory Rape, supra note 3, at 59. But see, State v.
Allen, 66 Wash. 2d 641, 643, 404 P.2d 18, 19 (1965),
where the court held that evidence of general reputation
for chastity is not admissible in a rape case, citing as
authority State v. Ring, 54 Wash. 2d 250, 339 P.2d 461
(1959), and State v. Sevems, 13 Wash. 2d 542, 125
P.2d 659 (1942). Both Ring and Severns, however, held
that specific acts of unchastity are inadmissible, not
that testimony concerning general reputation for
chastity is barred.
2FED. R. Ev. 608 and accompanying Advisory Com-
mittee's notes (1971 Revised Draft).
"1 E.g., 1 WiGmORE § 62; People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal.
App. 2d 334, 333 P.2d 82 (1958).
"Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape, supra note
3. For a general criticism of the consent standard, see
Comment, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation,
18 STrA. L. Rxv. 680 (1966).
2See People v. Cox, 383 Ill. 617, 622, 50 N.E.2d
758, 760 (1943) ("The underlying thought is that it is
more probable that an unchaste woman would assent
to such an act than a virtuous woman. ... ").
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admitting such testimony is that a person is likely
to act in conformity with past actions and that a
person's general community-wide reputation is a
good indication of what a person's past actions
have been.2
Admitting evidence concerning a complainant's
general reputation for sexual activity is ill-advised
on several grounds. Assuming that such evidence is
relevant, it is doubtful that a complainant's gen-
eral reputation in the community is the most
reliable index of a complainant's past sexual pro-
clivities. 25 Such evidence is limited to general
community-wide reputation on the belief that it
reflects a broad spectrum of community knowledge
and is less subject to prejudice and distortion than
the opinion of one person or a small group of per-
sons.26 However, because of the complexity, ano-
nymity, and sheer size of modem society, it is
difficult to determine not only in what community
a complainant may belong, but also what a com-
plainant's genuine community reputation for any
particular trait may be. Consequently, opinion
evidence of individuals and evidence of specific
acts by the complainant are more accurate and
reliable."8
Whether character evidence is presented as
general reputation, personal opinion, or specific
acts, it is admissible because the complainant's
past conduct is considered relevant in an evidenti-
ary sense to the issue of consent to a particular act
committed.'9 The underlying presumption of rele-
vance is that an unchaste complainant is more
likely to have consented to a sex act than to have
been coerced. 0 Theoretically, this presumption
leads to an inference that the complainant has
falsified his or her accusation of forcible assault.
31
Hence, in admitting such character evidence,
"Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testi-
mony, 24 IoWA L. Rav. 498, 514-18 (1939).
2Id. at 514-18, 527-28. Contra, Curley, Reputation
of a Witness for Truth and Veracity in Civil and Criminal
Cases, 46 MARQ. L. Rxv. 353 (1962).
26 Ladd, supra note 24, at 514-18.
2
71Id.
"8 While specific acts of unchastity are generally in-
admissible, evidence of certain types of other conduct
are. In People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal. App. 2d 334, 333
P.2d 82, 87 (1958), the court took great pains to point
out that while specific prior sexual acts may not be
admissible, specific instances of the prosecutrix having
made false accusations before were. See also 3A WiG-
moRE § 963; Note, Impeaching Witnesses by Showing
Specific Wrongful Acts, 11 HASTINGs L. REv. 74 (1959).
29 Cf. Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility, supra
note 19.
30 See note 23 snqpra.21FE). R. Ev. 404 and accompanying Advisory
Committee's note (1971 Revised Draft).
courts are presuming that an individual with a
libertine past is likely to make false accusations.
Just why the courts have made such a presump-
tion is unclear." Of the many possible reasons a
person may have of falsely accusing another of a
sexual offense, for courts to presume that the un-
chaste are more likely to falsely accuse than the
chaste seems highly unsound. One example of the
presumption's invalidity would be the case of a
"virtuous" woman who consents to intercourse,
regrets it the next day, and, to cover her guilt,
accuses her seducer of rape." The present evi-
dentiary rules might well lead to such a defend-
ant's conviction.
Rather than creating a safeguard for the falsely
accused, whereby the reasons for a complainant's
present statements are disclosed, these evidentiary
rules hinge conviction or acquittal on the com-
plainant's past reputation and conduct. Thus, the
intelligent sexual offender should confine his ac-
tivities to prostitutes.2 ' Because the prejudicial
2An early case advocating the admission of evidence
of the prosecutrix' reputation for chastity as a col-
lateral attack on her credibility was People v. Abbot,
19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. 1838), where the court made the
oft quoted statement:
IT]hat triers should be advised to make no distinc-
tion in their minds between the virgin and a tenant
of the stew?-between one who would prefer death
to pollution, and another who, incited by lust and
lucre, daily offers her person to the indiscriminate
embraces of the other sex? ... And will you not
more readily infer assent to the practised Mes-
salina, in loose attire, than the reserved and virtu-
ous Lucretia?
Id. at 195.
Abbot, a case involving a prosecutrix with a less than
spotless reputation, was cited as authority in Shirwin v.
People, 69 Ill. 55, 59 (1873), for the proposition that
character evidence was admissible in rape cases. Shirwin
was later cited in People v. Cox, 343 Ill. 617, 50 N.E.2d
758 (1943), for the same proposition. Cox was cited in
turn by People v. Collins, 25 fI. 2d 605, 186 N.E.2d 30
(1962). The beat of our forefathers' moral decisions
is still the rhythm today.
"In this author's interviews with police investiga-
tors, supra note 14, and interviews with Assistant
State's Attorneys in Cook County, Illinois, on May 4,
1972, and May 9, 1972, the interviewees expressed
several possible reasons why a complainant might make
a false accusation. Among them were: a young woman's
father finding out about his daughter's sexual involve-
ment with a man and forcing a prosecution to preserve
the daughter's reputation; a woman regretting a pre-
vious "indiscretion"; and revenge by a scorned lover.
"The author's police interviews, supra note 14,
revealed that the police almost automatically disbelieve
any rape accusation brought by a prostitute. The
reason is that the -police believe that such accusations
are made in an effort to force a recalcitrant "customer"
to pay. Amir, supra note 11, at 493, writes that rape is
more likely to take place if the attacker believes that
the victim is precipitating the incident, i.e., if the victim
is "asking" for it. A factor in the precipating process is
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effects of character evidence so outweighs its
logical relevance, 5 its use in sexual offense cases
should be abandoned.
PsYcH=ATRic EXPERTS
A more rational, scientific solution in determin-
ing the question of witness credibility36 in sexual
offense cases centers on the use of psychiatrists.-
Falsification of sexual matters, real or imagined,
is particularly within the province of psychiatry.n
A court appointed psychiatrist" can study a corn-
what the attacker believes to be the lustful character
of the victim. Id. at 494. Hence an individual with a
"bad" reputation might actually be more likely to get
raped; yet, the introduction of character testimony
makes conviction less likely.
35 H. KALvEx & H. ZEISEL, supra note 12, at 242-52,
discuss the prejudicial effect of testimony concerning a
prosecutrix' background and the relationship between
the defendant and the prosecutrix in terms of "assump-
tion of risk." Id. at 249-57. Their studies showed that
in cases where a rape obviously took place, a conviction
seldom occurred when factors such as the complainant's
bad reputation, the fact she went drinking with
strangers, or that she had been the defendant's lover
were introduced. Id. at 250. The trier of fact in those
cases would convict for a lesser included offense if one
were available and if not, acquit altogether. Id. at 251.
Kalven and Zeisel reported the acquittal rate in rape
cases to be 34%-40% depending on whether the trial
was by judge or jury; a remarkably high acquittal rate
for violent crimes. Id. at 20, 42.
36 There is a distinction between credibility of a
witness and competence to testify. Credibility goes to
the weight to be given the witness' testimony. Com-
petence is concerned with the witness' ability to
adequately recollect, observe and communicate that
about which he is testifying. A witness' competence is
not impeached; if a witness is not competent, he may
not testify. The courts have become progressively more
liberal as to the competence of witnesses. Consequently,
credibility is now a more significant factor. The use of
psychiatric experts in the context of this comment is
not to determine if the complainant is competent to
testify, but rather goes to the weight to be awarded the
complainant's testimony. See 2 WiGuoRE § 498; Weiho-
fen, supra note 3, at 54, 66, 68.
I 3 WiomoRE §§ 924(g), 934(a); Juviler, supra note
3, at 674; Weihofen, supra note 3, at 74; Note, Psychiat-
ric Testimony For The Impeachment of Witnesses in Sex
Cases, supra note 3, at 754.
2 Id.
31 Weihofen, supra note 3, at 78, and Juviler, supra
note 3, both recommend court-appointed psychiatrists.
The difficulties presented by the use of defense-ap-
pointed psychiatrists were evident in People v. Pierce,
11 Cal. App. 3d 313 318 & n.4, 320-21, 89 Cal. Rptr.
751, 754, 756 (1970). In Pierce the court refused to
admit the results of the examination because the ex-
amination was not conducted under the court's super-
vision and the judge held that particular psychiatrist
in low esteem. In People v. Davis, 20 Cal. App. 3d 890,
98 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1971), the difficulty arose because the
prosecutor did not like the particular psychiatrist
involved and thus urged the complainant not to submit
to the examination. For a discussion of court appoint-
plainant's background, thoroughly examine the
complainant,40 and then testify as an expert con-
cerning those psychological factors that might
influence the complainant's credibility relative to
the alleged criminal act.41 The value in the use of
such experts is that while psychological factors
that contribute to a complainant's falsifying would
be apparent to a psychiatrist, they would go un-
noticed or be misunderstood by a lay trier of
fact.Q
Initially, it should be clearly understood that
psychiatrists do not draw the ultimate conclusion
that a complainant should or should not be be-
lieved; that is the province of the jury. The court
in People v. Francis4 recognized this fact. The trial
judge in Francis demeaned the use of psychiatric
testimony to impeach a complainant's credibility
and stated:
You folks [giving the jury their instructions] lis-
tened to this boy [the complainant] for a day and
a half and I have faith in the jury system and I
feel that by listening to the boy for a day and a
half you are in a better position to determine
whether or not he is telling the truth than a psy-
chiatrist examining him for half an hour who comes
in here and told us what he thought of it."
In reversing the trial judge, the court said that
the purpose of such expert testimony was to eluci-
ment of psychiatrists in indigent cases, see Comment,
Criminal Law-Indigent Defendants' Right to Inde-
pendant Psychiatrist, 7 TUsSA L.J. 137 (1971).
40 The results of using in-court observation of the
complainant for purposes of an examination is com-
pletely unacceptable. The folly of such a course of
action was demonstrated by the disastrous results of
the psychiatric expert testimony used in United States
v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 185 F.2d 822
(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951). See
Weihofen, supra note 3, at 69-70. The experts cited
supra note 3, all emphasize the need for an extended
personal examination.
41 See Allen, Admission of Psychiatric Evidence: First,
A General Standard, 9 AR. L. REv. 205, 212 (1967);
Deiden & Gasparich, Psychiatric Evidence and Ful Dis-
closure in the Criminal Trial, 52 CAIax. L. REv. 543, 544
(1964); Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an
Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63
MIcH. L. REv. 1335, 1350-51 (1965); Juviler, supra
note 3, at 682; Roberts, Some Observations on the Prob-
lems of the Forensic Psychiatrist, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 240,
251-52; Taylor, Credibility of a Witness, 8 J. FoR. Sci.
325, 327 (1963).
4 Supra note 3. However, all those commentators
are not in total agreement as to the unquestioned
ability of psychiatrists to detect credibility charac-
teristics. See Weihofen, supra note 3, at 75.
4 5 Cal. App. 3d 414, 85 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970).
"Id. at 418, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
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date for the jury those psychological traits of a
complainant that might influence his or her credi-
bility in making a sexual assault charge.45 A psy-
chiatrist would, of course, relate to the trier of
fact the results of his examinations, but the ulti-
mate conclusion as to what weight to give both
the complainant's testimony and the testimony of
the expert would, as always, reside with the trier
of fact.
4 6
The major objection to the use of such expert
testimony is based on the inexactitude of the
science of psychiatry.47 Expert scientific evidence
is generally admissible if it consists of matter
beyond the normal scope of a layman's knowledge
and if such testimony is founded on good scientific
practice.4 While psychiatry is a developing science
and sometimes a controversial one, it presents a
valuable tool for the courts. As one group of com-
mentators wrote:
The law must recognize that the usefulness of
psychiatric evidence is not determined by the
exactness or infallibility of the witness science.
Rather, it is measured by the probability that
what he (the psychiatrist) has to say offers more
information and better comprehension of the hu-
man behavior which the law wishes to understand.49
Because of psychiatry's developing nature, the
courts should not adopt one school of thought"
or particular terms of art.5 ' However, they should
45 Id. at 419, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
46 Rather than try and maintain the tenuous distinc-
tion the court suggests in Francis, i.e., that the expert
is testifying as to his results but not testifying as to the
ultimate conclusion, a better-reasoned position seems
to be the one taken in FED. R. Ev. 704 (1971 Revised
Draft). That rule suggests allowing opinions that might
embrace one or more of the ultimate issues to be de-
cided; here, the credibility of the complainant. Such a
rule is founded on a belief that the lay jury or judge is
well able to determine the weight to be given the ex-
pert's testimony. See note 40 supra.
4 See United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340, 344
(D.D.C. 1966); cf. People v. Nash, 36 Ill. 2d 275, 222
N.E.2d 473 (1966); Note, Evidence-Psychiatric Ex-
amination of Principal Witness in Murder Trial Denied,
29 OHio ST. LJ. 505 (1968).
41 Cf. Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923). See also FED. R. Ev. 702 and accompanying
Advisory Committee's note (1971 Revised Draft);
Juviler, supra note 3, at 658; Comment, The Evidentiary
Value of Spectrographic Voice Identification, 63 J. Cans.
L.C. & P.S. 343, 348-52 (1972).
41 Diamond & Louisell, supra note 41, at 1342.
11 See generally Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Juris-
prudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053 (1968); Kaplan, An Aca-
demic Lawyer Plays Armchair Analyst: Some Speculation
on the Rdeevance of Psychoanalysis to the Law, 46 NEB. L.
REv. 759 (1967).
11 Juviler, supra note 3, at 661-62. The courts often
require that the expert use terms understandable to the
not ignore psychiatry altogether. If the courts are
to fully utilize psychiatrists' expertise and at the
same time guarantee that such testimony reflects
well-reasoned scientific conclusions, certain safe-
guards should be followed. Traditionally, expert
testimony has been presented in the form of hypo-
thetical questions.5 This method is consistent
with the usual question-answer manner of exam-
ination and theoretically makes clear to the trier
of fact on what the expert bases his opinion. The
use of hypothetical questions is particularly un-
suited to maximize the value of psychiatric
testimony." The hypothetical question does not
lead to a complete revelation of the expert's
opinion, but only that which the questioner wishes
to disclose. It is therefore highly susceptible of
bias."
An alternative to the hypothetical question is
narrative testimony.'5 A well reasoned in-court nar-
rative opinion by an expert comes after an exten-
sive interview of a complainant and a thorough
investigation of the complainant's background.56
At trial, the expert would relate in terms under-
standable to laymen the factors on which he bases
his opinion, why he came to the opinion he did, and
exactly what that opinion is. In all cases, before he
undertakes an examination, a psychiatrist should
clearly understand what his role is and how he is
expected to testifyY7 Such a procedure guarantees
that the psychiatrist's courtroom testimony will
focus clearly on the issue of a complainant's credi-
bility.
One difficulty in using narrative testimony,
which fully discloses all of the expert's sources and
the contents of his interviews, is that such testi-
mony often contains hearsay." Obviously, an
expert's testimony as to what a third party said
about the complainant's youth would be hearsay.
One guard against the dangers of hearsay is a psy-
chiatrist's detailed discussion of the nature of his
sources and its effect on his opinion. 59 The trier of
jury. See People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 187, 443 P.2d 794,
70 Cal. Rptr. 210, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968).
52 See Deiden & Gasparich, supra note 41, at 555-57;
Diamond & Louisell, supra note 41, at 1345-48; Tuch-
ler, supra note 41, at 329 (1963).
5See note 52 supra.
5See note 52 supra.
55 Diamond & Louisell, supra note 41, at 1345-46.
6 Note 41 supra.
57 Roberts, supra note 41, at 249-50.
58 Deiden & Gasparich, supra note 41, at 549-554;
Diamond & Louisell, supra note 41, at 1350-54.
59 Note, Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony: A
Case for Full Disclosure, 53 IowA L. REv. 1287 (1968).
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fact should be instructed that evidence concerning
a psychiatrist's sources is offered to demonstrate
the validity of the psychiatrist's conclusions and
not for its truth.60 Of course, the greatest safeguard
against the dangers of hearsay in this situation is a
vigorous cross-examination because it will high-
light any inherent weaknesses of the testimony and
clearly show that such evidence is relevant only to
the issue of the complainant's credibility.6
Another objection to the use of psychiatric testi-
mony is the so-called shocking invasion of a prose-
cutrix' privacy" and the belief that such examina-
tions will discourage reporting of sexual offenses."
It is unlikely, however, that psychiatric examina-
tions pose a greater discouragement to reporting
sexual offenses than the physical examinations that
are often required in such cases" or the com-
plainant's eventual experience on the witness
stand."
Psychiatric testimony concerning complaining
witnesses' credibility was admitted as early as
1929. In People v. CowlesO two doctors testified
that the prosecutrix was a "pathological falsifier,
a nymphomaniac, and a sexual pervert." " United
States v. Hiss" marked the major breakthrough for
the admission of a psychiatrist's testimony con-
cerning witness credibility.69 In the celebrated trial
of Alger Hiss, Judge Goddard admitted the testi-
mony of a psychiatrist who had observed Whit-
taker Chambers in court.7° While the result was
certainly not that which the defense had hoped for,
it marked the real emergence of psychiatrists for
the purpose of impeaching a witness' credibilityY'
Many courts have recognized the value of psy-
chiatry and, under certain circumstances, have ad-
mitted psychiatric testimony.Y The court in Bur-
0 See Deiden & Gasparich, supra note 41, at 544.
61Deiden & Gasparich, supra note 41, at 556-57;
Diamond & Louisell, supra note 41, at 1344-46; Ladd,
Some Observations on Credibility, supra note 19, at 259.
2Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, supra note 3,
at 1142. See United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340,
342-43 (1966); State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 151
N.W.2d 157 (1967).
63 Juviler, supra note 3, at 664-65; Note, supra note
17, at 237-38.
See Juviler, supra note 3, at 665.
"DeFrancis, supra note 3, at 16.
60 246 Mich. 429, 224 N.W. 387 (1927).
"Id. at 431, 224 N.W. at 387.
s 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 185 F.2d 822
(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951).
19Conrad, Mental Examination of Witnesses, 11
Sxa~cUsE . REv. 149, 151 (1960).
70 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).71 Conrad, supra note 69.
7 United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.),
afrd, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
ton v. State,7 a 1952 Indiana supreme court deci-
sion, held that a psychiatric examination of a
complainant in order to evaluate his credibility in
a sexual offense case was required under "certain
circumstances." While the court did not delineate
what those circumstances were, the facts of the
case indicated that there was no material corrobo-
ration and the complainant's testimony was of
doubtful credibility 4 Burton was overruled by
Wedmore v. Stak7" to the extent that it required an
examination of the complainant. The Wedmore
court felt that the power to require psychiatric ex-
aminations of complainants could only emanate
from the legislature.76
In Easterday v. State,7 the Indiana supreme court
held that psychiatric examinations of complaining
witnesses were not required in all sexual offense
cases, but that ordering such examinations was
within the discretion of the trial judge. However,
the court also held that not ordering an examina-
tion in cases in which there was no material cor-
roboration and there was substantial reason to
doubt the witnesses' credibility was an abuse of
discretion and reversible error.l The court's sub
silentio overruling of Wedmore in Easterday repre-
sents the relatively recent judicial trend to order a
psychiatric examination of a complainant and ad-
mit its results in sexual offeinse cases.79 In the ab-
sence of a provision in criminal codes analogous to
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"0
the courts have held that the power to compel psy-
chiatric examinations of complaining witnesses
948 (1951); Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 159,
410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966); Easterday v.
State, 254 Ind. 13, 256 N.E.2d 901 (1970); State v.
Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958).
7 232 Ind. 246, 111 N.E.2d 892 (1953).
74Id. at 252-53; 111 N.E.2d at 894-96.
75 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957).
76 Id. at 220, 143 N.E.2d at 653.
- 254 Ind. 13, 256 N.E.2d 901 (1970).
's Id. at 14, 17, 22, 256 N.E.2d at 901, 903, 906.790 United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D. 340 (D.D.C.
1966); State v. Wahrlich, 105 Ariz. 102, 459 P.2d 727
(1969); Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 159, 410
P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1966); Dinkens v. State,
244 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1971); Easterday v. State, 254
Ind. 13, 256 N.E.2d 901 (1970); State v. Butler, 27
NJ. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958).80 FE. R. Civ. P. 35(a) provides in part:
When the mental or physical condition (including
the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the
custody or under the legal control of a party, is in
controversy, the court in which the action is pend-
ing may order the party to submit to a physical
or mental examination by a physician or to produce
for examination the person in his custody or legal
control.
COMMENT
arises from the judiciary's inherent power to initi-
ate and order procedures which are necessary to
insure a just result in judicial proceedings.8 ' Al-
though the prevailing judicial opinion is that courts
do have the inherent power to order psychiatric
examinations in sexual offense cases,82 the availa-
bility of these orders is limited.
There is some question as to when courts will
order psychiatric examinations of complainants in
sexual offense cases. The prevailing view is that
ordering such examinations is within the discretion
of the trial judge and an examination will only be
ordered following a motion by the defense and in
the face of "compelling need." 8' While the defini-
tion of "compelling need" is somewhat obscure, a
recent series of California cases gives some insight
into the developing parameters of the "compelling
need" test.
Extensive dicta in Ballard v. Superior Courts8
emphasizes that sexual offense cases are an excep-
tion to the general rule that psychiatric opinions
cannot be used to impeach witnesses.85 The court
in Ballard stated that psychiatric examinations
would be ordered in sexual offense cases where
there was a "compelling need" for them. 6 The
court stated that "compelling need" was deter-
mined by the totality of the circumstances of each
case. While the absence of material corroboration
alone did not establish compelling need, its lack
was one element necessary to meet the compelling
need testy
The California supreme court in People v.
Russel s expanded on the compelling need criterion.
In reversing a lower court's decision refusing to
order a psychiatric examination, the court in
Russell held that a trial judge, when deciding
whether to order an examination, must look to
those mental or emotional conditions of the com-
plainant which might affect his or her credibility
and which a lay jury may not notice or interpret
correctly.89 The court held that examinations
should be ordered liberally and that the examina-
tion results should be presented so as not to usurp
81 E.g., State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 604-05, 143 A.2d
530, 552-56 (1958), citing as one authority, In re
Peterson, 253 U.S. 303, 312 (1920).82 Juviler, supra note 3, at 663.
81 Note 80 supra.
84 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1968).851 Id. at 172-73, 410 P.2d at 847, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
81 Id. at 176-77, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
8
7 1Id.
- 69 Cal. 2d 187, 443 P.2d 794, 70 Cal. Rpti. 210,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968).
89 Id. at 195, 443 P.2d at 800, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
the province of the jury to make the ultimate find-
ing of the complainant's credibility."
The compelling need test that seems to have de-
veloped in California is two-pronged.9' One requires
a lack of material corroboration. The other prong,
which also must be met, requires the trial judge to
detect reasons to doubt the complainant's credi-
bility.
The major objection to this two-pronged test is
its denial of psychiatric examinations and testi-
mony when they are most needed. When material
corroboration is available, a sex offense victim's
story is presumably made more credible. Thus, the
possibility of conviction by a false accusation is
somewhat reduced. However, where material cor-
roboration is absent, psychiatric examinations and
the admission of such expert testimony should not
be limited as they presently are. The rationale be-
hind the use of psychiatric evidence is that it will
reveal those personality traits and psychological
factors which influence a complainant's credibility,
but cannot be detected, understood, or appreciated
by laymen. In limiting the use of psychiatrists to
those circumstances where a judge detects false-
hood in a complainant, the courts have mistakenly
rejected the whole premise for admitting such testi-
mony; for it is in those cases where psychological
factors which contribute to falsehood are unde-
tected by laymen that the psychiatrist is needed.
As exemplified by the California experience, the
current standard for ordering psychiatric examina-
tions in sexual offense cases is therefore inappropri-
ate for two reasons. First, if the examination is
ordered only where the complainant appears to be
of doubtful credibility, then the examination really
is not necessary. The purpose for such examina-
tions-to protect an accused from false accusa-
tions-is to a degree eliminated by a complain-
ant's and defendant's own testimony. Second,
90 Id. at 198, 443 P.2d at 802, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
Two later cases, People v. Morales, 254 Cal. App. 2d
194, 61 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1967), and People v. Pierce, 11
Cal. App. 3d 313, 89 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1970), took a
narrower view of what constituted compelling need and
placed greater emphasis on the trial judge's discretion
in detecting a need for ordering examinations and
admitting their results.
91 Some courts and commentators refer to what they
call the inverse ratio test. That test would increase the
need for psychiatric experts as the amount of material
corroboration decreased and the complainant's dubious
credibility increased; United States v. Dildy, 39 F.R.D.
340, 344 (D.D.C. 1966); Note, Psychiatric Aid in
Evalwting the Credibility of a Prosecuting Witness
Charging Rape, 26 IND. L.J. 98 (1953). See also Juviler,
supra note 3, at 676, where he seems to suggest such a
test although he does not give it a name.
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ordering examinations only where the complain-
ant appears to be falsifying eliminates that whole
group of cases where the psychiatrist is most
helpful and most necessary in protecting a falsely
accused defendant-where the complainant has a
credible and irrefutable story which psychiatric
evaluations and evidence could prove to be the
product of psychological disorders.
CONCLUSION
In recognizing the disturbing frequency of false
accusations in sexual offense cases, the courts have
tried to provide some safeguards for an accused.
Unfortunately, these protective devices are insuffi-
cient. Character evidence, while purporting to
protect an accused, is actually a ruse whereby a
jury's attention is diverted from the particulars of
a defendant's actions at the time of an alleged
sexual assault to the complainant's past life and
conduct.
The credibility of a complainant in a sexual of-
fense case is better impeached by psychiatric testi-
mony. Rather than obfuscating a ser crime trial
with torpid and frequently irrelevant episodes from
a victim's past, psychiatric evidence discloses those
factors which influence the credibility of what a
complainant says. Such evidence is more relevant
than character testimony. It is focused on and ad-
dressed to the reasons for and foundations of a
complainant's accusations and present conduct,
whereas character evidence is concerned with a
complainant's past conduct.
However, while the courts are beginning to rec-
ognize that psychiatric evidence is preferable to
character evidence to impeach a' complainant's
credibility, they have failed to appreciate its sig-
nificance and utility when it is most needed. Until
the courts realize that psychiatric testimony is
needed most where it is not available, the unsatis-
factory predicament of the falsely accused will not
be assuaged.
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REMOVAL OF STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS TO FEDERAL
COURT UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1443
Despite the ever-expanding panoply of constitu-
tional and statutory federal rights,' effective reme-
dies are not always available to protect their
exercise. One method by which the exercise of fed-
erally protected rights has been delayed and de-
terred is through abuse of the state criminal
process. Among the abuses are mass arrests for
crimes which are never tried,2 selective prosecutions
under statutes which are either unconstitutional on
their face or as applied,3 biased judges, juries that
'Rights enactments in the last decade include the
24th and 26th Amendments to the United States
Constitution (abolishing the poll tax and granting the
18 year old vote, respectively), the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of
28, 42 U.S.C.) (voting rights, access to public ac-
commodations, equal employment opportunity, etc.),
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973-73p (1970), and the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §§3601-31 (1970).
Courts, of course, have also been active in broaden-
ing the scope of constitutional rights. Arthur Goldberg,
former Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
contends that constitutional rights expand while a
liberal Court is sitting but never contract. A. GOLD-
BERG, EQUAL JUSTICE: Trip WARREN ERA OF THE
SUPREME COURT 96 (1971). However, this view does
not imply that the remedies for enforcing established
rights necessarily expand or even remain static. For
example, in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971),
the Supreme Court allowed the defendant's statements
to be used to impeach him although they were inad-
missible as evidence because proper Miranda warnings
had not been given. Similarly, President Nixon has
asked Congress to temporarily bar federal courts from
ordering busing to attain racial balance in schools.
See New York Times, March 18, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
Since neither the Supreme Court nor the President has
the power to amend the Constitution, presumably the
rights underlying these remedies remain intact.2 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 5, 1971, at 1, col. 1
(10,000 arrested in Washington, D.C., during anti-war
demonstrations, many without the proper arrest forms
being filled out).
3See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111
(1969) (disorderly conduct convictions resulting from
demonstration for desegregated schools); Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) (loiter-
ing statute unconstitutional); Barr v. City of Colum-
bia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964) (breach of the peace convic-
tion for blacks' attempt to be served in restaurant);
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963) (breach of
peace statute used to foster racial segregation in pub-
lic park); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)
(convictions for disturbing the peace resulting from
blacks' efforts to be served in restaurant totally devoid
of evidentiary support).
do not represent the population of the community,
4
and totally baseless arrests and prosecutions.
5
The effect of many of these abuses could be less-
ened by an expansive judicial reading of the civil
rights removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1443, a cen-
tury old remedy. In certain situations, § 1443 per-
mits a defendant to remove a pending state court
proceeding to the federal district court before trial
has commenced. 6 Once removal is accepted, the
federal district court assumes complete jurisdiction
of the matter, with power to either proceed with
trial or to dismiss the case.
Removal of a state criminal prosecution to fed-
eral court provides a much quicker adjudication of
federal issues, shortening by months or years the
prejudicial consequences a defendant suffers while
under indictment or in prison. Immediate resolu-
tion of a federal issue by means of removal also
avoids the expensive and time consuming burden
of appealing a state conviction through the state
courts.7 Furthermore, removal may diminish the
chilling effect an illegal local prosecution can have
on federally guaranteed rights.8
Enacted as § 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,9
4
See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972) (21% black population in the parish; 7% of
eligible juror pool black, one on petitioner's venire,
none on the grand jury which indicted him). See also
LA. CODE Cne. PRO. Art. 402 (1967), exempting
women from jury service unless they volunteer.
5See, e.g., Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2u 7, 12
(1972) (Brown, C. J., dissenting).
Other methods that have been used to suppress
federal rights are described in U.S. CoAmfissIoN ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL
PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH (1965) and W. KUNSTLER,
DEEP IN My HEART (1966).
.i Although the statute also provides for removal in
civil cases, it has been most often utilized by criminal
defendants.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) (1971) provides that a writ of
habeas corpus for a person in state prison shall not
be granted unless that person has exhausted the reme-
dies available in the state courts and state corrective
process, or circumstances exist which would render
the process ineffective to protect his rights.
8 See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808,
845-46 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he threat of sanctions may deter...
almost as potently as the actual application of sanc-
tions."
9 Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
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REMOVAL UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1443
the removal statute provided for original and re-
moval jurisdiction in federal courts in civil and
criminal cases "affecting persons who are denied or
cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of
the State" any of the rights enumerated in § 1 of
the act."0 It also applied in cases in which any
"officer... or other person" was prosecuted for
"any arrest or imprisonment, trespasses or wrongs
done" under "color of authority." of the act or
"for refusing to do any act upon the ground that it
would be inconsistent with" the statute." The re-
moval provisions then became § 641 of the Revised
Statute of 1875, at which time the reference to
rights secured by § 1 of the 1866 Act was replaced
by "any law providing for the equal civil rights of
citizens." 12
The removal provision has been carried forth
substantially unchanged since 1875,"3 and is now
§ 1443 of the Judicial Code.14 It reads:
§1443. Civil rights cases.
Any of the following civil actions or criminal
prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be
removed by the defendant to the district court of
the United States for the district and division em-
bracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot
10Section 1 provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians
not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States; and such citizens, of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall have the same right,
in every State and territory in the United States,
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property, and
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, as is en-
joyed by white citizens and sballbe subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalities, and to none
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary not withstanding.
nd. §3.
2 "REV. STAT. § 641 (1875). The guarantees of § 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were carried forward as
§§ 1977 and 1978 of the Revised Statute of 1875 and
are now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 (1970).
1 For a more elaborate history of the removal
provision, see New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255
(2d Cir. 1965); Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions
Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal
Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State
Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 867-68 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Amsterdam]; Johnson, Removal of
Civil Rights Cases from State to Federal Courts: the
Matrix of Section 1443, 26 FED. B.J. 99 (1966).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1950).
enforce in the courts of such State a right under
any law providing for the equal civil rights of citi-
zens of the United States, or of all persons within
the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived
from any law providing for equal rights, or for re-
fusing to do any act on the ground that it would
be inconsistent with such law.
Subsection (2) applies in very few cases. By its
language, this subsection could apply to private
citizens exercising federal rights who derive "color
of authority" "5 for their activities from any statu-
tory or constitutional provision.6 However, sub-
section (2) has been held not to apply to private
citizens, but only to federal officers, and those as-
sisting them, who are acting pursuant to their
duties under a federal law providing for equal civil
rights.'
7
Most of the confusion and most of the cases have
arisen under subsection (1). There are two require-
ments for removal to federal court: The defendant
must claim a right under a federal law providing for
equal civil rights; and he must claim that he is
unable to enforce this right in the state courts.
TIE FIRST REQUmEMENT: "ANY LAW PROVIDING
FOR TIE EQUAL CIVIL. RIGHTS OF CITIZENS ...
The federal rights protected by the original civil
rights removal provision were listed in § 1 of the
same 1866 statute."8 In the 1875 revisions, how-
ever, the specific reference to "rights secured...
s Color of authority exists when a person is clothed
with authority of law or when he is acting under pre-
tense of law. United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785,
786-87 (5th Cir. 1953); People v Plesniarski, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 108, 112, 99 Cal. Rptr. 196, 199 (1971).
Color of authority may be derived from an election,
however irregular or informal, In re Krickbaum's
Contested Election, 221 Pa. 521, 70 A. 852 (1908), or
from an arrest warrant, even though void. Screws v.
United States, 140 F.2d 662, 665 (5th Cir. 1944). How-
ever, simply because a person has a valid defense
under a law in a criminal case does not mean that in
committing the offense he was acting under color of
authority. Cochran v. City of Eufaula, 251 F. Supp.
981, 984 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
"The original language of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which referred to "officers ... and other per-
sons" acting or refusing to act, seems to support this
argument. For an in-depth analysis of the history of
the statutory language, and arguments for and against
applying subsection (2) to ordinary citizens, see Judge
Friendly's opinion in New York v. Galamison, 342
F.2d 255, 262-65 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Amsterdam,
supra note 13, at 874-75.
17City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808,
814-24 (1966).
"8 See note 10 supra.
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by the first section" of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
was deleted in favor of the more general phrase
"any right secured to him by any law providing for
the equal civil rights of citizens of the United
States . *..." 29
The defendants in Georgia v. Rachel" and City of
Greenwood v. Peacock2' petitioned for removal under
§ 1443, alleging that they were being prosecuted
for civil rights activities which were protected by
the first amendment, as well as the due process,
privileges and immunities, and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,21 the Civil Rights Act of 1957,21
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.2 Mr. Justice Stewart, writ-
ing for the Court in both cases, held that the sub-
stitution in 1875 of the phrase "any right secured
to him by any law providing for the equal civil
rights of citizens" was not intended to greatly ex-
pand the kinds of laws to which the original re-
moval section referred,2 5 and therefore § 641 of the
Revised Statutes of 1875 applied only to laws
which were similar to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Justice Stewart noted that the 1866 act enumerated
certain rights which were to be exercised by all
citizens "as [they are] enjoyed by white citizens." 26
He therefore co'ncluded that "any law providing
for the equal civil rights of citizens" meani only
laws which granted specific civil rights stated in
19 REv. STAT. § 641 (1875).
20 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
21384 U.S. 808 (1966).
2142 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, et seq. (1964).
242 U.S.C. § 1971 (1957).24 See note 12 supra.
21Justice Stewart noted, 384 U.S. at 790 n.13,
that prior to 1875 Congress had not made removal
applicable to the rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment, the fifteenth amendment, the Civil
Rights Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140, as amended
by Act of February 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433, or the Civil
Rights Act of April'20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13. He infers
that since Congress did not make removal applicable
to these provisions at the time they were enacted, it
did not intend to do so in 1875 by broadening the
language of the removal provision. Justice Stewart
also noted that the removal provision of the Revised
Statutes of 1875 was cross-referenced to the new
sections which contained the rights that had been
protected by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Finally, he argued that limiting § 641 to laws com-
parable to the 1866 act comported with the relatively
narrow mandate to the revising commissioners "to
revise, simplify, arrange and consolidate all statutes of
the United States .... " Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140,
§ 1, 14 Stat. 74.
However, Professor Amsterdam points out numerous
instances in which this "narrow mandate" was ex-
ceeded and various laws were expanded. Amsterdam,
supra note 13, at 870.26 See note 10 supra.
terms of racial equality.27 The Court held that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,28 invoked by the Rachel
defendants, was such a law, noting that it guaran-
teed access to facilities of public accommodation
"without discrimination... on the ground of race
.... .. 29 The Court also indicated that the Pea-
cock defendants met the first requirement for re-
moval, but held that they failed to establish the
second requirement. 0
The Court, by way of dictum, stated in Peacock
that the broad guarantees of the first amendment
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment were not laws providing for specific civil
rights in terms of racial equality, because they were
phrased in terms of general applicability to all per-
sons. The Court, however, did not say that the
equal protection clause, relied on heavily by the
defendants, would not support removal2 ' Although
27 384 U.S. at 791. However, Justice Stewart over-
looks the fact that one of the successor statutes to § 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, using language prac-
tically identical to that of the original act, has been
applied to persons other than members of racial minori-
ties. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). See note 12 supra; Ro-
berto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811 (7th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950) (alien);
Kentucky v. Powers, 139 F.2d 452 (E.D. Ky. 1905),
rev'd on other grounds, 201 U.S. 1 (1906) (white mem-
ber of a political party). See also Anglo-American
Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 105 F. 537
(S.D.N.Y. 1900) (corporation). But see Perkins v.
Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md. 1960), aff'd, 285 F.2d
426 (4th Cir. 1960) (holding that § 1981 applies only
to blacks).
2078 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections
of 28, 42 U.S.C.).
29384 U.S. at 793. The act was not, however, di-
rected solely at racial minorities. Its provisions apply
to all persons "without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (a) (1964).
20 384 U.S. at 794-804. See text accompanying notes
52-65 infra.
3 The Rachel defendants did not invoke the equal
protection clause. 384 U.S. at 783-84. The Peacock
defendants did. Petition for Removal in City of Green-
wood v. Peacock, Civil Number GC6413, Paragraph
III, filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi, April 3, 1964; Brief
for Appellee at 17, City of Greenwood v. Peacock,
384 U.S. 808 (1966). The Supreme Court in Peacock
specifically stated only that the reference to "equal
civil rights" excluded the broad constitutional guar-
antees of the first amendment, and did not attempt a"precise definition of the limitations of the phraseZany law providing for ... equal civil rights.' " 384
U.S. at 825. Since the case was reversed on other
grounds, a decision on this issue was unnecessary.
In a non-criminal case, the Fifth Circuit indicated
that the equal protection clause would not support
removal. Student Non-Violent Coordinating Commit-
tee v. Smith, 382 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir. 1967). However,
the opinion summarily stated that the first and four-
teenth amendments did not meet the Rachel test of a
statute providing for specific civil rights stated in
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the equal protection clause applies to "any person
within [the United States'] jurisdiction," ", and
therefore does not grant rights in terms of racial
equality, certain essential rights of racial minorities
are guaranteed by the clause." There appears to be
no reason for denying these rights the protection
of the removal statute. Certainly the right to non-
segregated public schools, protected directly by the
constitutional amendment,U is entitled to the same
enforcement as the right to service in public ac-
commodations without regard to race, protected
by specific federal legislation."5 There is no sub-
stantive difference between the two rights to war-
rant one having lesser protection.
8
THE SECOND REQUIREMENT: "IS DENIED OR
CANNOT ENEORCE [TE RIGHT] IN
THE COURTS OF SUCH STATE..."
The Strauder-Rives cases, nine decisions by the
United States Supreme Court between 1880 and
1906,37 narrowly construed the second requirement
terms of racial equality, and did not specifically treat
the defendant's claim of rights under the equal pro-
tection clause.
nU.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The equal protection
clause applies to aliens, Sailer v. Leger, 403 U.S. 365
(1971), corporations, Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928), married women, Alexander
v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925 (W.D.S.C. 1956),
and illegitimate children, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968).
'3 See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964)
(right to run for public office without race of each
candidate opposite his name on ballot); Brown. v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (right to
desegregated public schools); Labat v. Bennett, 365
F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 386 U.S. 991
(1967) (systematic exclusion of black jurors); Colon v.
Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F.Supp. 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (private management corporation
must establish ascertainable standards for admittance
to publicly aided housing project).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, a seq. (1964).
"6If the United States Supreme Court had not de-
cided Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, Congress
might eventually have enacted legislation guaranteeing
desegregated schools. After Brown, there was less im-
petus for Congress to do so. Therefore, mere historical
accident may account for certain essential rights being
protected directly by the equal protection clause,
while others are protected by specific congressional
legislation. Therefore, the former ought not be denied
a useful remedy.
1Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Neal v. Dela-
ware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Bush v. Kentucky, 107
U.S. 110 (1883); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592
(1896); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896);
Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896); Williams v.
Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Kentucky v. Powers,
201 U.S. 1 (1906). Each case, with the exception of
for removal-that a federal right be denied or un-
enforceable in the state courts. The Slraudt-Rives
doctrine required as a condition for removal that a
discriminatory state statute or constitutional pro-
vision on its face abrogate the petitioner's rights.
For example, the black defendant in Straider v.
West Virginian8 had been convicted of murder. The
Court held that removal should have been granted
because a state statute prohibited blacks from
serving on juries, and therefore the defendant's
right to desegregated juror selection would most
likely be denied.' 9 In Strauder's companion case,
Virginia v. Rives,40 there was no discriminatory
state statute. The two murder defendants' allega-
tions of strong racial prejudice against them and
their argument that blacks had never been allowed
to serve on juries in cases in which a black was in-
volved, were held not to state grounds for removal.
Justice Strong, writing for the Court in both cases,
felt that it was fair to presume that a state court
would enforce a state statute even though it was
discriminatory on its face and abrogated a federal
right. When such a statute existed, he contended, a
defendant could predict that his federal rights
would be denied in the state court." However, the
Court determined that absent a discriminatory
state statute, it could not be presumed that a state
judge would fail to redress the alleged wrong, and
therefore a removal petitioner could not firmly
predict that his rights would be denied.4
RACHEL AND PEACOCK
After the Strauder-Rives line of cases, the re-
moval statute was not considered again by the
Powers, involved a claim of racial discrimination in
the selection of jurors. In _Powers, the white defendant
claimed discrimination in juror selection on the basis
of political affiliation.
38100 U.S. 303 (1880).
39 Id. at 312.
40 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
41 Id. at 321.
"1The Strauder-Rives doctrine has been criticized
as establishing an arbitrary distinction, since a de-
cision from the highest court in a state has as great a
value as legislation in predicting what a lower court
will do. The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HAuv. L.
REv. 91, 229 (1966). In this respect, Gibson v. Mis-
sissippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896), expanded the Rives de-
cision, stating that if the supreme court of a state in-
terpreted the state constitution or laws to deny a
federal right, the denial might be said to have arisen
primarily from the state enactments. Id. at 582.
However, under Strauder-Rives, neither judge-made
law nor local traditions and customs which perpetuate
racial discrimination provide a firm indication that a
defendant's federal rights are being or will be denied
in the state courts.
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United States Supreme Court until 1966,4 when an
exception to the Strauder-Rives doctrine was recog-
nized. In Georgia v. Rachel,M civil rights demonstra-
tors were charged with trespass under a Georgia
statute making it a crime to refuse to leave premises
when requested to do so by the owner or person in
charge.* The defendants petitioned the federal
district court for removal, alleging that they had
attempted to obtain service at restaurants in
Atlanta, Georgia, and that their arrests were ef-
fected for the purpose of perpetuating a policy of
racial discrimination in public accommodations.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, held
that § 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 196446 protects
the right of equal access to public restaurants with-
out regard to race. However, the Georgia trespass
statute applied to all persons regardless of race,
and therefore defendants' rights were not being
infringed by a state enactment discriminatory on
its face, as traditionally thought to be required for
removal under the Sirauder-Rives doctrine. Never-
theless, the Court concluded that any criminal pro-
ceedings against the defendants were prohibited if
their allegations were true. Mr. Justice Stewart
noted two events critical to the Court's holding,
both of which occurred while the case was pending
in the court of appeals. The first was the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 203 (c) of that
act makes it illegal "to punish or attempt to pun-
ish" any person for exercising the rights guaranteed
by § 201.0 Secondly, in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,41
the Supreme Court construed this language to pro-
hibit prosecutions for peaceful attempts to be
served in public accommodations and also applied
13 Remand orders were not reviewable after' 1887.
Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 553, as
amended Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 435.
Denial of a removal petition was appealable through
the state courts, but added nothing to whatever federal
claim formed the basis for the removal petition.
As a result of the Strazuder-Rivces doctrine, removal
was seldom granted, and the Supreme Court did not
consider the statute between 1906 and 1966. In 1964,
remand orders in § 1443 cases were made appealable.
28 U.S.C. § 1447 (d) (1964).
384, U.S. 780 (1966).
4 2 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3005 (1965 Cum. Supp.).
4642 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
a 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1964).
s 379 U.S. 306 (1964). The facts in Hamm were
quite similar to those in Racdel. Black civil rights
demonstrators were convicted on state trespass charges
for participating in lunch counter sit-ins. The Court
held that § 203 (c) prohibited the State from attempt-
ing to punish defendants by prosecuting them for
exercising their federal rights under § 203 (a). 379 U.S.
at 310-11. Thus, the state convictions were reversed.
the act to prosecutions pending at its passage. 9
Justice Stewart concluded that the defendants had
a federal right not to be prosecuted for remaining in
the restaurant if they were asked to leave solely
because of their race. Therefore, the very pendency
of the prosecutions was a denial of their rights.
Two cases were consolidated in City of Greenwood
v. Peacock.5 0 In the first, defendants were charged
with obstructing the public streets of Greenwood,
Mississippi. They alleged in their removal petition
that they were members of a civil rights group
which had been engaged in a drive to encourage
blacks to register to vote. In the second case, de-
fendants, charged with a variety of offenses,5'
denied that they had been engaged in any conduct
prohibited by valid laws and alleged that the prose-
cutions were solely for the purpose of harassing
them and deterring them from exercising their
right to protest the conditions of racial discrimina-
tion and segregation in Mississippi. justice Stewart,
again writing for the Court, rejected defendants'
claims for removal under both subsections of
§ 1443. He first determined that the history of
subsection (2) demonstrated that it referred only
to federal officers and persons assisting such officers
in the performance of their official duties.
In handling the subsection (1) claim, the Court
reaffirmed the Strauder-Rives doctrine. As in Rachel,
there was no state enactment that was discrimina-
tory on its face. Consequently, the question was
whether § 1443 (1) prohibited state prosecution for
petitioners' alleged attempts to exercise their fed-
eral rights. The five-Justice majority held that it
did not, distinguishing Rachel on two grounds.
Justice Stewart pointed out that despite a state
law making it a crime to do so, the defendants in
Rachel had a federal statutory right to remain in a
restaurant when ordered to leave because of their
race. He reasoned that the federal law "substi-
tute[d] a right for a crime." 52 However, the de-
fendants in Peacock, Justice Stewart argued, had
no absolute right to perform the destructive and
49 379 U.S. at 312-17.
60 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
a Various defendants were charged with assault,
interfering with an officer in the performance of his
duty, disturbing the peace, creating a disturbance in a
public place, inciting to riot, parading without a
permit, assault and battery by biting a police officer,
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, operating a
motor vehicle with improper license tags, reckless
driving, and profanity and use of vulgar language.
384 U.S. at 813 n. 5.
12 Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 315
(1964).
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violent acts with which they were charged. 3 Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that no federal law con-
ferred immunity from prosecution for this conduct,
as did § 203 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
which Hamm held prohibited attempts to punish
the right of access to public accommodations.
Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Brennan and Fortas, dissented in
Peacock. Justice Douglas contended that two dis-
tinct situations were envisioned by the "is denied
or cannot enforce" clause, one referring to a present
denial of rights and the other based on a prediction
of what state tribunals will do in the future. In
Justice Douglas' view, the Sirauder-Rives doctrine
was derived from cases in which defendants claimed
they would not be able to enforce their federal
rights in state courts. If the defendant could dem-
onstrate a firm prediction that the state court
would not make a good faith effort to enforce a
federal law pertaining to equal civil rights, then,
Justice Douglas reasoned, the federal court should
accept the removal and try the case on its merits.U
He argued that the Peacock respondents, however,
alleged a present denial of rights, so that the case
was governed by the "is denied" clause. If a federal
district judge determined that the state misused
the criminal process to suppress the present exer-
cise of civil rights, the proper remedy would be dis-
missal of the case.
The majority, perhaps to justify its narrow con-
struction of the statute, emphasized that even if
there is no right of removal in a particular case,
there may be other federal remedies. Justice Ste-
wart referred to direct review by the Supreme
Court, injunction against prosecution, post-con-
viction habeas corpus relief, federal court review,
and civil55 and criminal" sanctions against persons
5 384 U.S. at 826-27.
" Justice Douglas did not discuss what proof would
be required to show that the state court would not
try to enforce federal rights. He thought, however,
that such showings would be rare. Id. at 851.
65 41 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides for a civil
action against any person who under color of authority
of state law deprives another person of federal rights.
.s 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964) prohibits conspiracy to
injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen
in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States....
Violation of § 241 is punishable by a fine of up to
$5,000 and imprisonment up to ten years.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964) prohibits depriving anyone of
federal rights "under color of any law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, or custom" on account of his alien-
age, color, or race. The offense is punishable by a fine
of up to $1,000 and imprisonment up to one year.
violating civil rights. The minority responded that
the removal remedy was not co-extensive with
other remedies. It pointed out that an objective
fact finding process is often indispensable to the
enforcement of federal guarantees, and that swift
enforcement is frequently essential. Justice Doug-
las also cautioned against the chilling effect an
illegal prosecution can have. He noted, too, that
the habeas corpus right, civil sanctions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 57 and the criminal statutes prohibit-
ing conspiracy against the rights of citizens were
enacted shortly after the removal statute," so that
they should be coordinate with it, not preemptive
of it. ,
Furthermore, the remedies suggested by the
Court are largely designed to insure an after the
fact vindication of rights rather than to protect
their present exercise. Federal appellate and habeas
corpus relief, while possibly eventually exonerating
those convicted of trumped-up crimes, is costly and
time-consuming. The prospect of future civil or
criminal actions against persons interfering with
guaranteed rights is small consolation to someone
concerned only with exercising rights at that time
and place on an equal basis with others.59 The
primary goal of the law in the area of civil rights
should be to develop ways to make rights that were
granted years ago a practical reality. The removal
remedy aids this goal by shortening the time during
which a criminal defendant is under indictment or
in prison, by reducing the chilling effect of an illegal
prosecution, and by affording an impartial fact-
finding process." A federal injunction against state
prosecution would not have many of the short-
5
7See note 55 supra.
68 The removal statute was enacted in 1866. See
note 9 supra. The extension of the federal habeas
corpus remedy to state prisoners was passed by the
same Congress in 1867. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14
Stat. 385. The criminal statutes referred to in note 56,
supra, were enacted in 1870. Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 141 (conspiracy to interfere with
federal rights); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 17,
16 Stat. 144 (deprivation of federal rights under
color of state law).
59The civil remedy is further circumscribed by
the judicial immunity doctrine which exempts pre-
judicial and hostile judges from liability. Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Prosecutors may also be
nnmune from civil penalties if exercising their "quasi-
judicial duties." See Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 586
(3rd Cir. 1968); Link v. Greyhound Corp., 288 F.
Supp. 898 (E.D. Mich. 1968). But see Littleton v.
Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972) (allegedly dis-
criminatory state judges and state's attorney not
immune from injunction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983
(1970)).
60 See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
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comings of the other remedies suggested by Justice
Stewart. However, concepts of federalism and the
specific prohibitions of the anti-injunction statute
1
have largely cut short the potential of this rem-
edy. 62 In any event, the possible cumulativeness of
certain remedies in some situations should not un-
dermine their usefulness. 63 This is especially true
where, as with removal, the supposedly cumulative
remedy has been authorized by Congress."
The Peacock majority set forth a further reason
for its narrow construction of § 1443 (1). Referring
to the phenomenal increase in removal petitions in
- 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948) provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments.
6 Traditionally, federal court injunction of state
criminal proceedings has been limited to cases in which
plaintiff can show irreparable injury that is both
great and immediate. Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S.
240, 243 (1926); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), seemed
to make an exception to the strict historical prerequi-
sites for federal injunctive relief in cases in which an
overbroad state criminal law is shown to have a chill-
ing affect on first amendment rights. Id. at 486. How-
ever, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the
Court, while acknowledging that there was language
in Dombrawski that could lead to this interpretation,
id. at 50, explained its earlier decision on the ground
that the prosecution was in bad faith and had been
brought to harass the defendants. The Court held
that absent extraordinary circumstances, bad faith
and harassment are prerequisites to a showing of ir-
reparable injury. Id. at 53.
The question is still open whether the anti-injunction
statute, see note 61 supra, entirely bars a federal in-
junction while a state prosecution is pending. In
Dombrowski the state indictment had been dismissed
before the case reached the United States Supreme
Court, so the relief granted pertained only to future
threatened prosecutions. Of course, if it is decided that
F ending state prosecutions cannot be enjoined, the
ederal injunction remedy will in no way overlap with
removal, which is available only if a prosecution is
pending.
63 Justice Stewart himself alludes to the various
remedies that might have been available to the Pea-
cock respondents. See text accompanying notes 55-56
supra. The fact that there may be grounds for a federal
injunction against a threatened state prosecution does
not preclude individuals from seeking damages under
§ 1983, or any of the other remedies to which he refers.
Similarly, the existence of these remedies should not
preclude removal.
14 Although the removal statute was enacted over a
century ago, see text accompanying note 9 supra,
it was reconsidered as recently as 1964, at which time
remand orders in § 1443 cases were made appealable.
See note 43 supra. Thus, there is a relatively recent
Congressional intent to retain removal as a viable
remedy.
1964 and 1965,65 Justice Stewart warned of the
devastating effect on the federal court system that
a broad reading of the statute would have. He felt
that a vast number of cases would require a federal
court hearing, followed by trial in the federal court
or an appealable remand order. justice Stewart
foresaw immense delay in bringing cases to trial
resulting from overcrowded federal court dockets.
The minority was not as concerned with holding
state trials in federal courts when federal rights
are involved. Justice Douglas contended that the
historical purpose of the dual court system was
based upon a distrust of the ability of state courts
to resolve certain federal issues. The very purposes
of removal laws, he contended, were to insure ob-
jective fact-finding and swift enforcement of fed-
eral rights. In any event, Justice Douglas felt that
his reading of § 1443 (1) would result in few state
criminal trials being conducted in federal courts.
INTERPRETATION OF THE SUPREME COURT CASES
Rachel indicates that the Court was recognizing
a general exception to the Strauder-Rives doctrine.
Justice Stewart noted that the Rives case itself re-
fers to a denial of federal rights which "is primarily,
if not exclusively, a denial... resulting from the
Constitution or laws of the State .... ,6 Justice
Stewart added that removal should be available
whenever there is "an equivalent basis ... for an
equally firm prediction [that is, equivalent in pre-
dictive value to a discriminatory state enactment,
as in Strauder-Rives] that the defendant would be
'denied or cannot enforce' the specified federal
rights in the state court." 7 However, the Peacock
case limited the far reaching implications of Rachel.
The two cases must necessarily be read together,
15justice Stewart pointed out, 384 U.S. at 832
(citing 1965 DiR. ADniN. Orricas U.S. Cs. ANN.
REP. 214, 216), that in the fiscal year 1963 there were
14 criminal removal cases of all kinds in the entire
nation, 43 in fiscal 1964, and, in fiscal 1965, 1079 in
the Fifth Circuit alone. In fiscal 1966, 1967, 1968,
1969 and 1970, there were, respectively, a total of 383,
124, 71, 71, and 122 in the entire nation. 1970 DiR.
ArnrN. OrzicEs U.S. Cs. AN. REP. 267. Judge
Tuttle suggests in Whatley v. City of Vidalia, 399
F.2d 521, 522 n.1 (5th Cir. 1968) that the figures
referred to by Justice Stewart are misleading. He states
that one docketed appeal often represents numerous
removal petitions which can be disposed of by a single
order of judgment, and suggests that the appeals in
the Fifth Circuit in fiscal 1965 numbered in the tens
rather than the hundreds.
61 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313,319 (1880) (empha-
sis supplied by Justice Stewart).
67 384 U.S. at 804.
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and there has been some confusion in determininj
the extent of the remedy.
The federal circuits have struggled mainly wit]
two questions, each involving one of the ground:
on which Justice Stewart distinguished Peacoci
from Rachel. The questions are: (1) In what circum
stances does an individual have an absolute federa
statutory right to commit a crime? and (2) Whal
language in a federal law prohibits the State from
prosecuting a person for exercising certain federal
rights?
A Federal Right to Commit A Crime
The first question arises because the Peacock
opinion did not analyze the elements of, nor the
conduct underlying, some of the supposed crimes.
It seems apparent, as Justice Stewart stated, that
there is no federal right "to obstruct a public street,
to contribute to the delinquency of a minor, to
drive an automobile without a license, or to bite a
policeman." 61 However, petitioners were charged
with other offenses. Creating a disturbance in a
public place, disturbing the peace, and some of the
other charges 9 may have resulted from federally
protected conduct, such as the attempted exercise
of the right to vote. Unfortunately, the Peacock
opinion did not analyze the conduct underlying the
alleged crimes or the range of conduct which could
be encompassed by the definitions of these crimes.
As a result, Peacock did not answer the question
of whether removal could be avoided at the whim
of the local prosecutor simply by altering the crimi-
nal charge. In other words, would the result in
Rachel have been different if the crime charged had
been disorderly conduct rather than trespass? The
issue was presented in Walker v. Georgiao when
the defendant was prosecuted for trespass, riot,
malicious mischief, and other offenses against the
public order, allegedly resulting from her attempts
to gain service in a restaurant. Although the same
conduct was the basis for all the offenses, the federal
district court to which defendant removed dis-
missed only the trespass charge on the authority of
Rachel, and remanded the others on the authority
of Peacock.7 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
68 Id. at 826-27.
69 The crimes with which the Peacock petitioners
were charged are listed in note 51 supra.
70 417 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).7 Id. at 3. The district court did not write an opinion.The court of appeals noted, however, that the trespass
charge and the other charges against Miss Walker
arose from the same incident, and the latter were not
Circuit reversed the remand order, emphasizing
that the label which the state attaches to the sup-
1 posed criminal conduct should not affect federally
s protected rights. Judge Tuttle, writing for the
court, held:
It is what the mdvant was actually doing with re-
spect to the exercise of his statutory federally pro-
tected right.., that controls and not the charac-
terization given to the conduct in question by a
state prosecutor. 72
The Fifth Circuit has also held that removal is
available in cases charging assault,7' aggravated
burglary,7 4 vagrancy,75 acts against the public or-
der,76 and perjury. This result does not seem to
comport with Justice Stewart's admonition that
the federal law "substitute a right for a crime," 7
there being no federal right, for instance, to commit
assault or perjury. Nor does this result solve the
problems of federalism to which Justice Stewart ad-
vertedY9 Every case would require a hearing on
allegations by defendants that they did not commit
supported by any additional evidence. The court there-
fore concluded that the other charges were only "thinly
veiled trespass charges." Id. at 5.7
2 Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).7
3Walker v. Georgia, 405 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1969).
Appellant alleged that he was charged with assault for
trying to be served in a public accommodation covered
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Fifth Circuit
held that a federal forum should determine in the first
instance whether he was engaged in non-peaceable
conduct. Id. at 1192. If the state charges that a de-fendant committed an assault, and the charge is de-
ied, then a federal district court must conduct a fullevientiary hearing to determine whether grounds
exist for the charge. Such a hearing amounts to a
preliminary trial to determine what court will conduct
the actual trial of the charges.74Wyche v. Louisiana, 394 F.2d 927 (5th Cir.1967). LA. R:v. STAT. § 14.60 (1950), defines aggra-
vated burglary as:
the unauthorized entering of any inhabited dwelling
... with the intent to commit a felony ... if the
offender... (3) [clommits a battery upon any
person while in such place, or in entering or leaving
such place.
An element of the offense is unlawful entry of premises.
Since the premises involved, a truck stop, was apublic accommodation within the meaning of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964), there was
a conflict between the black petitioner's federal right
not to be denied entry on account of race and thestate crime.7 5 Achtenberg v. Mississippi, 393 F.2d 468 (5th
Cir. 1968).
76 Walker v. Georgia, 417 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1969).7 7 Davis v. Alabama, 399 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1968).7 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. at 831.




the crime charged and that they are being prose-
cuted solely for reasons relating to race.
At the other extreme, some courts require that
the crime charged conflict directly with a federal
equal civil rights law providing for racial equality, 80
i.e., even though the removal petitioner alleges that
he did not do the acts charged, the indictment it-
self-is tested against the federal rights. This inter-
pretation avoids the necessity of a protracted evi-
dentiary hearing on the merit of the prosecution,
which in effect would be a trial of the defendant in
federal court. However, this view contravenes the
language in Rachel indicating a broad exception to
the Strauder-Rives doctrine& Furthermore, it per-
mits the prosecutor to avoid removal by carefully
choosing the charge on which he indicts.
Between these extremes, the Supreme Court
cases can be read to permit removal if the definition
of the alleged crime is broad enough to encompass
the federally protected activities in which peti-
tioners allege they were engaged. This was true in
Rachel, where the crime of trespass, defined as re-
fusing to leave the premises when requested to do
so by the owner or person in charge, conflicted with
the federal right to remain. However, the conflict
between the state crime and the federal right may
not always be this clear. In Walker v. Georgia,s2 for
instance, the defendants were charged with various
80 This was, of course, the situation in Rachel, where
the state crime, refusing to leave the restaurant when
asked to 'leave, conflicted with the federal right to
remain if asked to leave solely because of race.
In North Carolina v. Hawkins, 365 F.2d 559 (4th
Cir. 1966), a black dentist was indicted for unlawful
interference with a voting registration commissioner
in the discharge of her duties and with the unlawful
procurement of the registration of four unqualified
voters. The court affirmed the order of remand with-
out a hearing, on the ground that Dr. Hawkins' alle-
gations of what actually occurred contradicted the
charges of the indictment. Id. at 560. Similarly, in
New York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 856 (1969), the petitioner alleged that
he was being prosecuted for menacing under N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120.15 (McKinney 1967), in retaliation
for exercising his rights pursuant to the Fair Housing
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970). Although he
alleged that the charge was completely false, the court,
noting that he had no federal right to menace anyone,
affirmed dismissal of the removal petition without a
hearing. See also Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7
(5th Cir. 1972) (remanding pirosecution for, inter alia,
reckless driving, resisting arrest, and interfering with an
officer); Hill v. Pennsylvania, 439 F.2d 1016 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971) (remanding prosecu-
tions for aggravated assault and battery, assault and
battery, unlawful assembly, and inciting to riot);
Hartfield v. Mississippi, 367 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1966)
(remanding prosecutions for parading without a
permit, obstructing public streets, using loud and
boisterous language).
offenses against public order statutes, including
riot. The Georgia Criminal Code defines riot as:
Any two or more persons who shall do an unlaw-
ful act of violence or any other act in a violent and
tumultous manner.... 
This statute could perhaps be construed to make
illegal a particularly vehement refusal to leave a
restaurant when ordered to do so because of race.
While there is no federal right to commit riot, there
is a right not to be punished for attempts to exer-
cise the federal right to service in public restaurants
covered by the 1964 Civil Rights Act.84
When removal is requested, the federal court
should determine the definition of the state offense,
relying on the statutory elements and the state
court construction. If the conduct in which a peti-
tioner alleges he was engaged is in fact protected
by a "law providing for the equal civil rights of
citizens" and at the same time could have violated
the local penal code, a hearing should be granted.
This interpretation of the removal statute would
dispose of the possibility that a local prosecutor
might manipulate the state charge in order to avoid
a direct conflict with the federal right (for example,
by indicting for disorderly conduct or riot rather
than trespass). If the state offense charged is so
broad that it might conceivably encompass the
federally protected activities in which a removal
petitioner alleges he was engaged, a federal court
hearing would be necessary to determine the truth
of his allegations: On the other hand, if the conduct
charged is clearly not protected by any federal law,
,no hearing would be necessary.
Such an interpretation of the removal remedy
would not prevent a local prosecutor from proceed-
ing on a wholly trumped-up charge.5 However, it
81 See text accompanying notes 66 & 67 supra.
82417 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1969).
81 GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-2601 (1968).
84 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
Similarly, in Achtenberg v. Mississippi, 393 F.2d
468 (5th Cir. 1968), civil rights workers were indicted
for vagrancy under a broad Mississippi statute, pun-
ishing, inter alia,
[plersons leading an idle, immoral or profligate
life, who have no property to support them, and
who are able to work and do not work.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 2666 (1957).
The petitioners claimed they were arrested for
exercising their right of access to a public library and a
Public restaurant. Since the facts were uncontested,
e court of appeals properly ordered the indictment
dismissed.
85 It would seem, however, that a local prosecutor
would be less willing to bring a wholly trump ed-up
charge than to discriminatorily apply a broad state
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would alleviate the concern expressed by Justice
Stewart in Peacock that a federal court hearing
would be required whenever a defendant alleges
that he is being prosecuted because of his race, that
he is innocent, and that he cannot obtain a fair
trial in the state court.8 6 Furthermore, by limiting
discriminatory enforcement of broad criminal
statutes, the suggested reading of Rachel and Pea-
cock would eliminate some of the possible abuses of
the state criminal process without thoroughly dis-
locating the traditional jurisdiction of state courts
to try state crimes.
Language Prohibiting Prosecution
The second feature which distinguished Peacock
from Rachel was the language of § 203 (c) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting anyone from
punishing or attempting to punish persons exer-
cising their right of access to restaurants under
§ 201.P The Court held that § 203 (c), as construed
in Harm v. City of Rock Hil,11 prohibited the state
from prosecuting the Rachel petitioners for activity
protected by a federal law. Unfortunately, the ma-
jority in Peacock did not distinguish similar
language from an applicable statute. Section 131
(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1957,19 which provides
that "[n]o person ... shall intimidate, threaten, or
coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or
coerce" persons exercising their right to vote, could
be construed to prohibit prosecution for the Pea-
cock petitioners' voter registration activities.9 0
Certainly, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
extended this protection to anyone "urging or aid-
ing any person to vote or attempt to vote," 91 cov-
ered petitioners' conduct.
The Peacock majority did not attempt to explain
its distinction between the language of the voting
rights provisions and that of the public accommo-
dations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
statute. Even if he were not concerned about the dam-
age to his reputation from such a complete abuse of
his powers, he would certainly be more likely to incur
civll or criminal penalties under federal law. See notes
55 & 56 supra.
88 384 U.S. at 832.
8
7 Id. at 826-27.
88 379 U.S. 306 (1964). See note 48 supra.
89 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (b) (1964).
90 Judge Sobeloff of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit contends that the right to encourage
others to vote is implicit in the right to vote, and,
therefore, the 1957 act protects voter registration
activities. North Carolina v. Hawkins, 365 F.2d 559,
561 (4th Cir. 1966) (concurring opinion).
9142 U.S.C. § 1973 (i) (b) (1965).
judge Tuttle of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit suggests two possible reasons why the vot-
ing rights acts were not held applicable to the
Peacock petitioners.'* First, the 1957 Act did not
expressly extend to persons who were aiding others
to exercise their right to vote. Although the 1965
Act would dearly have covered the petitioners' ac-
tivities, it may not have applied since the remand
orders in Peacock were entered prior to its effective
date.
If this is what the Peacock majority had in mind,
it did not make it dear. The 1957 Act, although not
explicitly applying to persons assisting others regis-
tering to vote, is amenable to such a construction.'
Justice Stewart nowhere indicates that the 1965
Act does not protect the defendants. On the con-
trary, the majority refers to the 1965 Act in a foot-
note,94 without in any way indicating that it is
inapplicable.
Secondly, judge Tuttle proposes that the simi-
larity of the provisions may not have been urged
upon the Court. 98 However, the Supreme Court
was surely aware of the similarity of the prohibition
against attempts to punish in the 1964 Act and the
prohibition against attempts to intimidate,
threaten, or coerce in the voting rights acts. In
fact, the majority in Peacock quoted § 131 (c) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1957,16 and referred to § 11
(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 97 and Justice
Douglas relied on the latter.8 Obviously, the Court
was aware of the relevance of these provisions.
A third possibility is that the Supreme Court did
not regard the prohibition against attempts to
"intimidate, threaten or coerce" as prohibiting
state prosecution." However, if the Court were
drawing this fine distinction between the effect of
this language and the effect of a prohibition against
"punish[ing] or attempt[ing] to punish," it is likely
9 See Whatley v. City of Vidalia, 399 F.2d 521 (5th
Cir. 1968).
9 See note 90 supra.
City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. at 811
n.3. There is no discussion whatsoever of the 1965 act.
It is merely quoted. Justice Douglas, in dissent, specif-
ically relies on the 1965 act. Id. at 847-48.
85 Whatley v. City of Vidalia, 399 F.2d at 525.
96 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. at 811 n.3.
97 d.
id. at 847-48.
Judge Sobeloff of the Fourth Circuit considers this
language more sweeping, and thus more clearly pro-
hibitive of prosecution, than the prohibition in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 against punishing or attempting
to punish. North Carolina v. Hawkins, 365 F.2d 559,
562-63 (4th Cir. 1966) (concurring opinion). The Fifth




that there would be some discussion of the point
in the majority opinion. Furthermore, § 131 (c) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and § 11 (b) of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 specifically refer to per-
sons "acting under color of law or otherwise,"
which bolsters the conclusion that these sections
were intended to apply to local officials, including
prosecutors and police.
None of the three reasons for the distinction be-
tween Rachel and Peacock is convincing. As a re-
sult, the two Supreme Court cases fail to establish
standards for judging whether language in a federal
law prohibits prosecution for exercising protected
rights.
In addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a federal provision
which arguably could immunize persons exercising
rights under it from state prosecution is § 101 (a)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,100 which makes it
a crime if anyone "by force or threat of force will-
fully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or at-
tempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with"
persons exercising certain listed rightsY" It was
contended in Hill v. Pennsylvaniae'0 that Congress
must have intended that persons exercising rights
under § 101 (a) would not be violating any state
laws since it would be irrational to make it a federal
crime to interfere with those committing a state
crime. The Third Circuit rejected this argument
because of the absence of the prohibition against
punishing or attempting to punish.103 By doing so,
10 18 U.S.C. § 245 (b) (1968).1 The listed rights include, among others, the rights
to vote, campaign for elective office, attend public
schools, serve on juries, travel or use any facility of in-
terstate commerce, and enjoy the benefit of any gov-
ernment program. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (b) (1968).
439 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1970).
11
3 Id. at 1020. The court's alternate reason for deny-
ing removal was that the crime charged, inciting to
riot, was not itself protected, as was the Rachel peti-
tioners' right to trespass. See New York v. Davis, 411
F.2d 750 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 856 (1969),
discussed in note 80 supra.
New York v. Horelick, 424 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1970),
also holds that § 101 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
does not provide immunity from prosecution as did
§ 203 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Rachel.
Judge Friendly, writing for the court, stated that
harassing officers and resisting arrest are not protected
activities. Id. at 702. He also noted that § 101 (a) is
it restricted the applicability of the Rachel doc-
trine to rights arising under the public accommo-
dation section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
CONCLUSION
Despite the broad language of the civil rights
removal provision and its potential for remedying
many possible abuses of the state criminal process,
the United States Supreme Court has very nar-
rowly construed the statute. Although § 1443 (1)
applies to "any person" who is denied a right under
a federal civil rights law, the Rachel and Peacock
decisions make it clear that only laws stated in
terms of racial equality will invoke its protection.
Thus, aliens, women, students, religious sects, and
other members of non-racial classifications, are
denied a remedy which could be useful in realizing
long-enacted federal rights. Persons, including
members of racial minorities, are not immune from
state prosecution while trying to exercise rights
guaranteed by broad constitutional amendments.
Furthermore, only when a discriminatory state
statute on its face abrogates a federal right, or when
a federal law immunizes state defendants from
prosecution for the acts with which they are
charged, are defendants able to firmly predict that
their federal rights will be denied in the state
courts, and thereby attain removal.
In some instances, federal courts have gone be-
yond the Supreme Court in restrictively applying
the removal provision. Perhaps, as one author has
suggested,'14 the civil rights removal statute should
be broadened by Congress. Unless and until this
happens, federal courts should liberally construe
the ambiguous portions of the Rachel and Peacock
opinions, giving the benefit of the doubt to persons
petitioning under § 1443. The rights granted under
the federal constitution and laws are frequently
clear-cut. However, these rights are meaningless
without provision for enforcement.
directed to intimidation "by force or threat of force,"
18 U.S.C. § 245 (b) (1968), and thus was not intended
to prevent the orderly functioning of the state criminal
process. 424 F.2d at 703.
104 Removal in Civil Rights Cases Under Section 1443
(1), 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 681, 689 (1967).
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